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Abstract 
ESSAYS IN FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INCOME INEQUALITY 
by 
Samuel Moon Jung 
 
Advisor: Professor Chu-Ping C. Vijverberg 
 This dissertation consists of three essays of original research. Chapter 1 is a survey of the 
literature on the theoretical and empirical interactions among financial development, economic 
growth, and income inequality.  
 Chapter 2 describes empirical research on the relationship between financial development 
and income inequality based on Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) method using a 
Chinese provincial dataset between 1998 and 2014. The empirical findings support the notion 
that well-developed financial markets increase income inequality in China. After adding a year 
dummy for 2001 to examine the impact of China’s entry into the World Trade Organization, 
which caused the financial system to deepen due to a surge in banking competition in China, 
positive impacts of financial development on income inequality increased.  
 Chapter 3 empirically investigates the association between financial development and 
income inequality based on spatial data analysis. As is well known, provincial Gini coefficients 
are not available for a few provinces and for certain years. To deal with this missing data, a 
GMM regression was estimated by using available data to obtain predicted values for the missing 
observations. An exploratory spatial analysis of 29 administrative units in China showed spatial 
dependence of provincial income inequalities. Finally, a spatial panel model was estimated. The 
empirical results reveal that financial development decreases income inequality in China. 
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Furthermore, the estimation exhibited significant spatial autocorrelation estimates with spatial 
dependence appearing in the disturbance term, indicating significant non-measurable reform or 
policy impacts. 
 Chapter 4 reconciles the difference between Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Empirical findings 
proposed in Chapter 2 based on the system GMM estimator suggest a positive relationship 
between financial development and income inequality, while findings suggested in Chapter 3 
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 Empirical and theoretical studies on the causal effects among economic growth, financial 
development, and inequality have increased over the last few decades. This is not surprising, as 
economic growth is accompanied by financial development. Although financial development has 
a favorable function of promoting economic growth, it can bring a dysfunction of increasing 
income inequality. In other words, development in the financial sector affects investment in 
human capital and/or physical capital; thus, by influencing capital allocation, financial 
development can change the aggregate output (which is analogous to economic growth) and the 
unemployment rate, with potential implications on poverty and income distribution.  
The literature indicates a positive relationship between financial development and 
economic growth, but the relationship between financial development and inequality remains 
unclear, both theoretically and empirically. For example, the theoretical framework suggested by 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) used a theoretical endogenous growth model and provided an 
inverted U-shaped hypothesis between financial development and inequality while Galor and 
Zeira (1993) provided a linear hypothesis.  
The empirical evidence is also controversial. Liang (2006) found that financial 
development tends to alleviate unequal income distribution of the urban-rural divide in China. 
According to Xie and Zhou (2014), however, income inequality, measured by the Gini 
coefficient, steadily increased from 0.30 to 0.55 from 1980 to 2012 despite improved financial 
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markets in China. In addition, the Gini coefficient for Shanghai, a major city in China and the 8th 
largest city in the world, increased from 0.244 to 0.389. The Gini coefficient for Chongqing, a 
major city in southwest China and one of five national central cities in China, increased from 
0.40 to 0.48, which is much higher than 0.3111, the average Gini coefficient for OECD countries.  
 Just as Chinese economic reform is in the spotlight due to its impact on economic growth, 
China’s continuous reforms have affected the depth of its financial sector’s development and 
innovation since the late 1970s.  As a first step to reform, the Chinese government abolished a 
central banking system and set up a two-tiered banking system. When the People’s Bank of 
China was designated as the Chinese central bank in the mid-1980s, several types of financial 
institutions formed, such as policy banks, equitized banks, city commercial banks, rural 
commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks, and foreign banks2. The Chinese financial 
system depends on its banking system, even though stock markets in China have developed 
quickly since the 1990s and total market capitalization in the Chinese stock exchange ranks 
fourth in the world; and China has the second largest stock market in Asia. On the other hand, in 
terms of the financial sector’s size, banks in China are larger than the stock market. Table 1.1 
shows that, after economic reform, financial sectors in China have developed rapidly: the ratio of 
the money supply (M2) to real gross domestic product (GDP) surged from 0.99 in 1995 to 1.91 
in 2014, the ratio of total deposits to real GDP increased from 0.88 in 1995 to 1.77 in 2014, and 
the ratio of total loans to real GDP increased from 0.82 in 1995 to 1.27 in 2014. Interestingly, 
China, the world’s fastest growing economy, achieved phenomenal growth, became the engine 
of global economic growth through stepwise economic reforms and financial development, and 
reduced the number of people living below the poverty line. Recently, however, against all 
																																																								
1 Source: OECD, “Income Distribution and Poverty: by country” archived from the original on 2015-04-02. 
2 Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)’s Annual Report  
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expectations, the Gini coefficient of each province in China sharply increased, which is an 
unpleasant scenario for economic growth, financial development, and income inequality.   
Table 1.1: Recent Trend of Financial Development in China: 1995 - 2014 
 M2/ GDP Deposits / GDP Loans / GDP 
1995 0.99 0.88 0.82 
1996 1.05 0.96 0.85 
1997 1.14 1.03 0.94 
1998 1.22 1.12 1.02 
1999 1.32 1.20 1.04 
2000 1.34 1.23 0.99 
2001 1.42 1.30 1.01 
2002 1.51 1.40 1.08 
2003 1.61 1.51 1.16 
2004 1.57 1.49 1.10 
2005 1.59 1.53 1.04 
2006 1.57 1.53 1.03 
2007 1.49 1.44 0.97 
2008 1.49 1.46 0.95 
2009 1.75 1.71 1.14 
2010 1.76 1.74 1.16 
2011 1.74 1.65 1.12 
2012 1.80 1.70 1.17 
2013 1.86 1.75 1.21 
2014 1.91 1.77 1.27 
           Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbooks 
 Early literature focused on the association between economic growth and inequality (i.e., 
Chen, 1996; Kuznets, 1955; Lardy, 1978, 1980; Lyons, 1992; Oi, 1993; Oshima, 1992; Sloan, 
1994; Williamson, 1965; Yang, 1996) and on the relationship between financial development 
and economic growth. As world financial markets continue to grow rapidly, there is greater 
importance on the impacts of financial development. Thus, topics extended to the relationship 
between financial development and economic growth (Boyreau-Debray, 2003; Zhang et al., 
2012). In addition, issues on economic growth, financial development, and inequality continue to 
focus on the relationship between financial development and inequality (i.e., Atkinson & 
Brandolini, 2001; Banerjee & Newman, 1993; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine, 2004; Clarke, 
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Xu, & Zou, 2003; Galor & Zeira, 1993; Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1990; Liang, 2006; Li, Squire, 
& Zou, 1998; Qi , Ran, Mingxing, & Chen, 2003; Tsui, 1993; Wei & Wang, 1997; Wei & Wu, 
2001). 
 With increasing interest in income inequality, Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) questioned 
potential problems from the use of a secondary dataset. A potential problem in using secondary 
datasets is inconsistency in the definition. Another possible problem in using Gini coefficients 
for cross-country analysis is the use of different source data. For example, when we calculate a 
Gini coefficient, the primary source of data is from a national household survey. However, other 
administrative data can be used as well, so the data source for calculating a Gini coefficient can 
differ. 
 In this paper, I describe various literature on economic growth, financial development, 
and inequality, including theoretical and empirical studies, using a cross-country analysis and a 
Chinese sample. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relationship between 
economic growth and income inequality in China, including a theoretical framework and 
empirical evidence. Section 3 describes the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth in China. Lastly, Section 4 reviews a theoretical framework and empirical 
evidence on financial development and inequality in China. 
 
1.2 Economic Growth and Inequality 
 The theoretical studies, empirical works, and political worries about the course of income 
inequality as the product of economic growth have brought the causal link between economic 
growth and income inequality to the forefront. In the following, I review literature on economic 
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growth and inequalities and then describe empirical evidence using a cross-country analysis and 
a Chinese case.  
 
1.2.1 Early Theoretical Framework on Economic Growth and Income 
Inequality 
 Much theoretical and empirical research on economic growth and income inequality has 
its roots in the classical contributions of Kuznets (1955). He created a theoretical framework to 
hypothesize that economic growth is linked to inequality in an inverted U-shaped pattern, where 
income inequality widens at the first stage of development and then is reduced at the later stage 
of development. In the early stages of an industrial revolution, a country experiences 
urbanization, where cities are the center of the country’s economy. As former workers in a rural 
area migrate to the city for high paying jobs in an industrialized urban area, the income 
disparities between urban and rural areas increase. When income per capita approaches a certain 
point, income disparities between urban and rural areas are expected to be lower due to the 
emergence of a new industrial system, such as free market economy, which facilitates additional 
rapid economic growth. Therefore, Kuznets suggested that the level of income inequality can be 
explained by an inverted U-shaped curve since the level of income inequality increases in the 
early phases of economic growth, like low-income countries or developing countries, and after 
achieving a certain point, the level of income inequality decreases again in later phases of 
economic growth, like high-income countries or developed countries.   In a simple model, 
Vijverberg (1991) examined the contributing factors to inequality in a growing economy.  Using 
the model, the author attempted to analyze the phenomenon: why some countries experienced a 
higher income inequality during the growth process while other countries mingled fast economic 
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growth with a good record of income distribution?  Under a monotonic saving rule (i.e., a family 
that owns more capital saves at least as much as a family that owns less capital), the conflict 
between equity and growth (i.e., higher inequality and higher growth) is not due to “wealthy 
families save more”.   Rather, the conflict is caused by the condition that the inequality of saving 
is strictly greater than the inequality of capital ownership.   The conditions for an economy to be 
in conflict and/or non-conflict regimes were analyzed in details.   Under a non-monotonic saving 
rule, Vijverberg (1996) incorporated social class mobility and macroeconomic conditions in the 
conflict/non-conflict analysis of equity and growth. 
 Barrios and Strobl (2009) suggested a theoretical model to analyze the dynamics of 
regional growth. Once a technological innovation takes place in a specific region, this region 
would receive the benefits of a high rate of growth at the initial stage of economic growth. The 
other regions will catch up to this leading region with a lag, and the length of this lag depends on 
differing technological capabilities. Thus, regional inequalities increase at the first stage of 
technological innovation and later decrease after achieving the peak of regional inequalities. This 
is because lagging regions adopting technological innovation will develop at the same rate with 
those of the leading region and then will have additional growth impact from the natural rate of 
convergence. This model suggests an inverted U-shaped hypothesis in the short run, while 
Kuznets’ hypothesis focuses on long-run structural changes. Turnovsky (2015) developed a 
model to investigate the association between economic growth and income inequality focusing 
on public investment as a key determinant of the association. He suggested a general equilibrium 
growth model with heterogeneous agents, which is characterized by homogeneity of the utility 
function and the same unrestricted access to perfect factor markets for all agents. In this model, 
government investment promotes the productivity of private capital, encouraging its 
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accumulation. Thus, under the unequal distribution of private capital among agents, government 
investment increases wealth inequality over time.  
 
1.2.2 Empirical Evidence on Economic Growth and Income Inequality 
 First, I describe literature on the relationship between income inequality and economic 
growth for developed or developing countries using a cross-country analysis. Next, I describe the 
relationship between economic growth and income inequality in China. 
 Williamson (1965) depicted patterns of regional inequalities under the process of national 
development using examples of the U.S., France, Italy, Spain, Germany, Canada, Brazil, Sweden, 
Australia, Norway, and India by focusing on a new popular phenomenon of regional income 
inequality known as the North and South Problem, which illustrates the absolute differential 
between rich and poor areas. The cross-country analysis found that economic development and 
regional inequality have the following pattern. As the national economy grows and expands, the 
degree of regional inequality narrows. Among the countries in the sample, Spain, Italy, 
Columbia, and Brazil, nations below the middle-income class, did not generate the expected 
conclusion that lower income per capita is associated with greater income inequality. U.S. data, 
however, generated what was expected − the lower income per capita, the greater income 
inequality. In addition, data on Germany, Sweden, France, and Canada showed that regional 
inequality widened substantially at an early stage of economic development, while regional 
inequality was reduced as the national economy matured. In conclusion, the gap between the rich 
and the poor is deeper in the agricultural sector than in the industrial sector.   
 In another influential study, Ahluwalia (1976) studied the relationship between economic 
growth and income inequality using a cross sectional data set of 14 developed countries, 40 
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developing countries, and six socialist countries, creating a multivariate regression model to 
examine the cross-country association between development process and income inequality. The 
empirical results strongly support the hypothesis that income inequality widens at the beginning 
of economic development and then decreases in the later stages of economic development. 
Secondly, the average real income of the lower percentile group increased as the gross national 
product (GNP) per capita increased, even though the speed of increasing real income for the 
lower percentile groups was more gradual than for the upper income groups. Finally, the findings 
do not support the view that higher income inequality is related to faster economic growth.  
 Oshima (1992) discussed Asian income distribution trends in relation to the inverted U-
shaped curve. The Asian income distribution trends corresponded to the inverted U curve; 
however, the peak of the Asian income distribution trends differed from Western countries 
except for Japan, whose income inequality trends are similar to the trends of Western countries. 
More specifically, the peak of Asian income inequality trends was achieved earlier in the course 
of development growth than those in Western countries. While the Gini coefficient of Western 
countries decreased in the 1920s when income per capita exceeded $2,000, the peak Gini 
coefficient of Asian countries was reached when income per capita exceeded $1,000. This is 
because Asian countries are aligned to the agricultural sector, while Western countries are 
aligned to the industrial sector. 
 Although there is no strong supportive evidence that economic growth influences income 
inequality, Psacharopoulos et al. (1995) looked at how a period of recession during the 1980s 
affected income inequality of 18 Latin American countries. Unlike Kuznets’ (1955) inverted U-
shaped curve for a long-run relationship, the authors investigated short-run cyclical behavior 
between growth and inequality based on micro data obtained from household surveys. The 
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reduction in economic growth widened income inequality among the Latin American countries 
and an increase in economic growth decreased income inequality measured by the Gini 
coefficient and the share of wealth of the bottom 20th percentile. Since economic crisis exerts 
downward pressure on wages and employment, employees were forced to agree to wage 
deductions or become unemployed and, therefore, income inequality deteriorated. 
 In another cross-country analysis on economic growth and income distribution, Ravallion 
and Chen (1997) researched the empirical link between economic growth and income inequality 
using a data set of 67 developing countries from 1981 to 1994. To provide alternative measures 
of distribution and poverty, the authors analyzed the relationship of poverty changes with 
economic growth. They found that higher growth rates tended to reduce the rates of poverty over 
the between 1981 and 1994. Overall, for the whole sample, the increase in average consumption 
was connected to reduced income inequality. However, when data from Central Asia and Eastern 
Europe were excluded, income inequality tended to widen. This empirical finding is not robust 
since the negative coefficients of the economic growth measures were insignificant. In addition, 
the authors found that income inequality was not associated with average consumption growth 
when dropping the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. They found that growth in 
average living standards was strongly associated with the rates of absolute poverty reduction.  
Scully (2002) researched the association between economic growth and inequality using 
a cross-country dataset of developed and developing countries in Asia for 1975, 1980, 1985, and 
1990. A main finding is that in a regression equation that explain the Gini coefficient (a measure 
of income inequality), the slope of the degree of economic freedom is negatively significant, 
suggesting that more economic freedom, a measure of the role of government policy in 
stimulating economic development and in reducing income inequality, is associated with a 
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decrease in income inequality. Also, the estimate of the effect of economic growth on inequality 
was negative and statistically significant, which means income distribution equalized as the 
economy grew and expanded. In conclusion, a higher degree of economic freedom resulted in 
more equal income distribution, and economic growth improved income disparity.   
 However, Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) and Clarke et al. (2003) exposed potential 
problems in the comparative analysis using cross-country data, stating that secondary cross-
country data has problematic issues related to data quality and data consistency. These potential 
problems will be discussed later in detail. Instead of using a cross-sectional dataset, Krongkaew 
and Kakwani (2003) analyzed how economic growth affects income inequality in Thailand, one 
of the fastest developing countries in Asia, using a dataset between 1962 and 2000. They found 
that the number of people under the poverty line decreased as GDP increased due to the increase 
on the growth rate of GDP, but Thai people’s income distribution became less equal. According 
to these findings, the association between economic growth and income inequality conforms to 
the Kuznets curve, which indicates an increase in inequality as starting from a lower level of 
development. In addition, the authors found that the impact of economic growth on poverty 
reduction is offset by a high degree of unequal income distribution.  
Recently, Fawaz et al. (2014) examined the effect of income disparities on economic 
growth applying system GMM based on World Bank classifications (56 countries classified as 
high-income developing countries and 55 countries classified as low-income developing 
countries) from 1960 to 2010. Their findings revealed that income inequality is positively 
associated with economic growth measured by per capita GNP in high-income developing 




1.2.3 Economic Growth and Income Inequality in China 
 Next, I turn to research related specifically to economic growth and income inequality in 
China. Lardy (1978) examined how the Chinese government regulated resource allocation, the 
relationship between these government policies and the pattern of economic growth, and the 
association between these policies and income distribution in China. The paper described the 
adoption of the Soviet model of planning, which is about the extension of central control to 
functional areas in the Chinese economy. This intensively centralized system was quite 
successful in inducing investment and accelerating economic growth in China. However, these 
radical policies for a vertical relationship between economic planning and management severed 
developmental relations among local governments that had no economic cooperation in their 
provinces. A centralized system on decisions resulted in inefficiency as well. In addition, 
although a causal relationship between economic growth and the rise of income inequality was 
not completely discovered, the paper found that planned economic control can mitigate the 
negative distributive outcomes of economic growth.  
 
1.2.3.A Economic Growth and Income Inequality at the Urban-Rural Level 
 The central government set in motion many transitional measures that positively 
influenced the economic welfare of Chinese rural areas (Oi, 1993). While people in rural areas 
improved their income, the income gap between urban and rural was extraordinarily high in 
China compared to other developing countries in Asia between 1978 and 1990. According to the 
paper, the main source of income inequality in China came from the gap between the urban and 
rural income during this time. Examples of the central government’s policies are the following: 
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revising urban-biased pricing for grain under the procurement plan and relaxing of the rural 
economy structure permitting people in rural areas to diversify to more profitable grain and to 
involve the industrial sector rather than the agricultural sector. These reforms were not 
considered persistent shifts to a rural bias reform, and economic development of rural areas in 
China was not the fruit of urban or rural bias but the result of local governments’ efforts. 
 Yang and Wei (1996) summarized several key factors that led governors to rethink 
regional inequalities and key policies, such as credit availability, tax incentives, and interregional 
cooperation, to decrease income disparities. The income gap between rural and urban areas in 
China doubled between 1965 and 1992. Since the State Council decided to stimulate rural 
enterprise development in order to reduce rural-urban income gaps, several forms of government 
policy remarkably preceded rural enterprises’ development. Many local governments and 
enterprises accepted and instantly applied the central government’s policies, which favored  rural 
enterprises’ interests. However, the central government’s effort to decrease regional inequality 
did not properly reduce the gap between the coast region and the inland area. Chinese leadership 
recognized the economic gap between urban and rural areas. As a result of their recognition of 
the urban and rural gap, a session of the National People’s Congress in 1995 emphasized 
economic development policies of inland regions and ethnic areas, such as intergovernmental 
fiscal transfers and foreign investment.  
 
1.2.3.B Economic Growth and Income Inequality at the Province Level 
 Unlike previous research on economic growth and income inequality at the urban and 
rural level, Lyons (1992) re-examined the Chinese model of development in terms of provincial 
growth and income inequality at the province level. New provincial income data released by the 
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State Statistical Bureau in China from 1952 to 1987 and the coefficient of variation, a measure of 
income inequality, were utilized for the analysis of economic growth and income inequality. The 
author summarized the dispersions of each measure, net material product as an output measure 
and the coefficient of variation as a measure of inequality, to look into within provincial level 
disparities. First, the analysis on output data captured provincial disparities at the initial stage of 
development. Based on the analysis of dispersion, overall growth rates and industrialization rates 
are quite different among provinces, and the evidence related to consumption shows a solid trend 
toward narrowing inequality across the Chinese provinces in terms of relative distribution. 
Disparities in growth rates in consumption are similarly compressed by transfers among 
provinces and by separating consumption from output in non-agriculture. In sum, the author 
argued that interprovincial inequality has narrowed since 1983.    
 Chen and Fleisher (1996) examined the relationship between regional inequality and 
Chinese economic growth by focusing on the impact of the growth process during the post-Mao 
transformation period on provincial inequality. Based on panel data between 1978, which was 
the beginning of the economic reform, and 1993, they saw that overall provincial inequality 
measured by the coefficient of variation narrows but that the inequality between coastal and non-
coastal regions increases somewhat. This is mainly because government encouragement and 
private investment incentives create a significant income gap among provinces in China. 
 
1.3 Financial Development and Economic Growth 
1.3.1 Characteristics of Financial Development in China 
 A developed financial system facilitates transactions, mobilizes savings, allocates these 
funds to economic activities, and supervises the activities of the recipients of those funds. A 
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well-developed financial system accompanying these roles enhances economic growth (Levine, 
1997). On the other hand, an underdeveloped financial system leads to as misallocated credit, 
misplaced loans, and poorly managed borrowers, which may harm economic growth (Calomiris 
& Hubbard, 1990). China’s economy has grown tremendously since its initial economic 
transition in 1978. China has now become part of the Group of Two (G2)3 along with the United 
States as the two most influential and powerful countries. According to Allen et al. (2005), there 
is a high probability that China will be the world’s largest economy within 10 years based on 
purchasing power parity (PPP). As is well known, China’s tremendous growth has been 
accompanied by its financial development. That being so, Allen et al. (2005) argued that China is 
a counterexample to the conventional relationship between finance and economic growth.  
China’s banking system transition was initiated in the early 1980s. The four state owned 
specialized banks, called as The Big Four, started to accept deposits and engaged in banking 
activities in the 1980s. Even as the Big Four converted to publicly-listed banks and as more 
domestic/foreign banks joined the system, the Chinese government still has a dominant impact 
on banks’ activities. While China has experienced a huge transformation in the financial sector, 
four major state-owned banks possess over 60% of the total financial assets in China. However, 
the banking sector’s efficiency is poor since it is dominated by four large state-owned banks.  
 The state-owned banks were inefficient. In 1978, China separated the People’s Bank of 
China from the Ministry of Finance. Then in 1979, the Chinese government re-founded the Bank 
of China, the People’s Construction Bank of China, and the Agricultural Bank of China so they 
might compete for lending services and savers. In 1983, the People’s Bank of China was 
designated as the central bank. In addition, the Industrial and Commercial Bank was founded to 
																																																								
3 The concept of G-2 (Group of Two) was proposed by noted economist C. Fred Bergsten in 2005. 
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provide more financial services. It is now the largest bank in China with half of all bank lending. 
Additionally, three smaller national banks (Everbright, Hua Xia, and Min Sheng) entered the 
Chinese banking sector and a number of regional banks opened in 1987 and 1988. Different 
types of non-bank financial service providers, such as trust and investment firms: urban credit 
cooperatives: and financial service companies that provided securities, credit rating, and 
financial leasing services, were established in the mid-1980s. The Chinese government generated 
a variety of structural changes in the financial system, but policy loans4 are the prominent 
characteristic of its financial structure. In fact, by the end of 1991, policy loans made up 67% of 
Bank of China’s assets, 51.2% of Agricultural Bank’s assets, 58% of the Construction Bank’s 
asset, and 25% of Industrial and Commercial Bank’s assets (Cull & Xu, 2000). Lastly, an 
important point of Chinese financial structures is that 25% of state owned enterprises’ (SOE) 
loans depended on direct government transfers in the early 1980s. This decreased to about 2% 
between 1990 and 1994. In contrast, the proportion of bank finance not dependent on 
government transfers increased from 15% to 32% between 1980 and 1987.  
Cull and Xu (2003) analyzed the link between bank finance and state-owned enterprises’ 
productivity in China from 1980 to 1994. Using a probit model where the dependent variable is 
access to finance and a tobit model where the dependent variable is the share of total finance, 
Cull and Xu (2003) found that bank finance is positively correlated with SOEs’ profitability. Its 
positive association between bank finance and profitability was stronger in the 1980s. However, 
in the 1990s, the positive association between bank finance and SOEs’ profitability weakened 
since the responsibility for SOE bailout moved from the government to banks. Additionally, the 
																																																								
4 The Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC), China Development Bank (CDB), and the Export-Import 
Bank of China (Chexim) were found in 1994 as policy banks to conduct government expenditure. Brandt and Zhu 
(2000) indicate that 84 percent of all new credits extended by state owned banks was utilized for the state owned 
enterprises from 1979 to 1993. This is called policy loans.  
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authors did not find any strong association between direct government transfers and SOEs’ 
profitability in the 1980s and 1990s.  
 A second stage of financial reforms in China occurred between 1994 and 2000. Initially, 
three policy banks for policy lending were founded in 1994 and the central bank adopted indirect 
monetary control. Later, in 1995 the central bank enacted the Commercial Bank of Law of China 
to establish pivotal elements for the operation of commercial banks. In 1998, the Chinese 
government ceased credit planning for state-owned commercial banks. Lastly, in the late 1990s 
the Chinese government restructured state-owned commercial banks and founded four Asset 
Management Companies using 270 billion Yuan of government money. Notably, in 1996 the 
first private-owned bank, China Minsheng Bank Corporation, was founded and 13 national joint-
equity commercial banks were established by the beginning of 2000. 
 Since China’s entrance into the World Trade Organization (WTO) on December, 2001, 
China has taken more active policies such as liberalization of the interest rate, relaxation of 
regulations on foreign banks, and mitigation of restrictions on ownership takeovers to encourage 
non-state financial intermediaries along with more foreign banks entering into domestic credit 
markets. After WTO entry, the Chinese government established the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) in 2003 to improve asset quality, risk control, and capital adequacy. 
Consequently, since the CBRC forced all newly founded shareholding commercial banks to have 
one or more foreign strategic investors, restrictions on foreign investors and banks have relaxed 
and the number of foreign banks has sharply increased. At the end of 2006, there were 223 
foreign banks from 42 countries and 242 representative offices (Wang & Zhang, 2009).  
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1.3.2 Theoretical Framework on Financial Development and Economic 
Growth 
 This section reviews theoretical works on the association between financial development 
and economic growth. The cost of obtaining information or enforcing financial contracts brings 
the need for financial intermediary development. According to Merton and Bodie (1995), the 
efficiency of financial intermediaries affects the redistribution of financial resources. When 
banking sectors’ efficiency improves, the cost related to obtaining information and transactions 
is reduced and credit allocation is more efficient. Similarly, as stock and bond markets mature, 
people gain more investment opportunities that, in turn, make this investment more liquid than 
conventional savings. In brief, market frictions due to imperfect credit markets motivate financial 
intermediary development and, again, these more advanced financial markets improve efficiency 
that can affect economic growth. According to Levine (2005), a well-developed financial system 
enables reduction in the cost to produce information, monitor investment activities, manage risk, 
and to mobilize. 
 Boyd and Prescott (1986) argued that financial intermediary development reduces the 
cost for producing information and allocating capital in ways that may improve the allocation of 
financial resources since people are confronted with the high transaction cost connected with 
examining firms’ and managers’ financial soundness. Therefore, the emergence of financial 
intermediaries that extend loans and accept savings reduce the cost of producing information on 
possible investment. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) suggested a model for the dynamic 
relationship between finance and economic growth. Like Boyd and Prescott (1986), they agree 
that financial intermediary development generates preferable information with the least 
transaction cost, improves the allocation of financial resources, and, therefore, promotes 
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economic growth. However, unlike Boyd and Prescott (1986), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) 
pointed out that when each investor utilizes financial intermediaries to reduce the cost related to 
examining the soundness of firms and managers and to investigating economic situations, it is 
still costly. In their argument, credit accessibility, which is mostly provided by financial 
intermediaries, is necessary for the implementation of investment activities and business 
projects. For this reason, as more investors are able to utilize financial services offered by 
financial intermediaries, the ability of financial intermediaries to produce information on 
possible investments and to allocate capital will be improved.  
Lastly, Galor and Zeira (1993) discussed a linear relationship, which implies that a well-
developed financial system reduces income inequality. Imperfect financial markets harm 
economic growth because misallocated credit prevents individuals from investing into human 
capital. Since the accumulation of human capital is negatively affected by capital market 
imperfection, the initial wealth distribution has an impact on who has a chance to utilize the 
credit resources in order to accumulate human capital.  
 Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) argued that if monitoring investment does not work properly 
due to an underdeveloped financial system, this imperfect system may impede the mobilization 
of capital resources from possible investors and savers. Thus, monitoring investment activities 
derived from a well-developed financial system affects firms’ performance accompanied by 
large capital investment and, in turn, influences economic growth.   
 Efficient capital mobilization is necessary for economic growth. As discussed already, 
one barrier to mobilize financial resource is the fixed cost of transaction and information 
acquisition on possible investments, which can be alleviated by the efficiency of financial 
intermediaries. Sirri and Tufano (1995) argued that these imperfect market frictions, which cause 
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high transaction and information acquisition costs, can be alleviated by financial intermediaries 
who provide reliable financial products to investors and savers. Therefore, financial 
development, which fosters mobilizing financial resources, can stimulate economic growth by 
boosting capital investment. In another influential study by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), one 
of main advantages of mobilizing financial resources is to create a small denomination 
investment, which allows individuals to diversify risks, and attract more investment and savings 
from small investors or savers. As a result, financial development supports the reallocation of 
existing financial resources and, therefore, gives positive spillover on economic growth. Aghion 
et al. (2004) suggested a model to analyze how the ability of companies to access credit affects 
technological innovation and growth in the long run during recessions. Assuming there exists 
adjustment costs to research and development (R&D), the model incorporates whether 
companies invest into low return investments or into R&D, which can enhance companies’ 
growth but might be more risky. Thus, a well-developed financial system enables firms to 
decrease adjustment costs to R&D, which promotes the ability of firms to access credit for 
technological innovation, while under-developed financial systems reduces firms’ accessibility to 
credit due to relatively high adjustment costs to R&D.  
Recently, Laeven et al. (2011) suggested a theoretical model reflecting the profit 
maximization behaviors to explain how financial innovation has been a driving force of financial 
development and economic growth. In their model, lenders try to screen potential borrowers, 
companies, and to innovate better ways to screen borrowers. Financial innovation, which creates 
more effective screening, improves the rate of technological innovation, which affects economic 
growth. Again, this technological innovation positively affects financial innovation, which is 
endogenous coevolution of financial and technological innovation.  
	 20	
1.3.3 Empirical Evidence on Financial Development and Economic Growth  
 The impact of financial intermediary development on economic growth is frequently 
debated and convincing empirical evidence indicates that financial intermediary development 
accelerates economic growth. In assessing the impact of financial development on economic 
growth, some researchers used a pooled cross-country dataset, including developed and 
developing countries. Joseph Schumpeter (1911) showed that financial services, such as 
mobilizing savings, evaluating projects, facilitating transactions, monitoring managers, and 
managing risk, are necessary for economic growth. King and Levine (1993b) investigate 
Schumpeter’s view with a dataset of 80 countries between 1960 and 1989. To measure the 
degree of financial development, they suggested a ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, the 
importance of deposit banks relative to the central bank, the ratio of credit issued to non-financial 
private firms to total credit, and the ratio of credit issued to nonfinancial private firms to GDP. 
Their results indicate that a higher degree of financial development is related to greater economic 
growth, physical capital accumulation, and improvements in economic efficiency. Furthermore, a 
higher degree of financial development is connected to efficiency improvements and accelerating 
capital accumulation in the long run.  
 By means of a cross-country dataset of 63 countries from 1960 to 1995 and dynamic 
panel techniques, Beck (2000) examined the empirical relationship between financial 
development and real per capita GDP growth, total factor productivity growth, the accumulation 
of physical capital, and the rates of private savings. But Beck (2000) found that a higher degree 
of financial development brings about greater economic growth. While previous literature 
focused on the relationship between financial development and economic growth, Beck also 
focused on the relation between financial development and the sources of economic growth, such 
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as private savings rates, physical capital accumulation, and total factor productivity. Financial 
development was positively associated with economic growth and total factor productivity 
growth and these rigid links do not arise from unobserved country specific effects or 
endogeneity. However, the relationship between financial development and both physical capital 
growth and savings are not clear.  
 In another study, Rioja and Valev (2004) tested whether financial intermediary 
development affects capital accumulation and productivity using a cross-country dataset of 74 
countries and GMM dynamic panel techniques. Three financial development measures were 
constructed: the ratio of the credit issued to the private sector to the GDP, the ratio of 
commercial bank assets to commercial plus central bank assets, and the ratio of currency plus 
demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries to GDP. 
Findings revealed that financial development was significantly and positively associated with 
economic growth, productivity growth, and capital growth. Subsequently, a cross-country dataset 
of 74 countries was classified into low-, middle-, and high-income countries. For middle and 
high-income countries, the estimated coefficients of each financial development measure were 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. For low-income countries, however, the 
estimated coefficients of each financial development measure were not statistically significant. 
More interestingly, in terms of the coefficient’s magnitude, high-income countries’ estimated 
coefficient was larger than that of middle-income countries’ estimated coefficient. This implies 
that the impact of financial development on economic growth varies considerably depending on 
capital accumulation.   
 Next, I review literature on whether financial intermediary development affects economic 
growth in China. The majority of evidence concludes that financial development causes higher 
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economic growth. Boyreau-Debray (2003) explored the province level relationship between 
financial intermediation and economic growth in China by applying the traditional growth 
regression framework to a panel of provinces in China. First, arguing the fragmentation of 
regional capital markets, the author justifies the existence of local credit channels. Next, with 26 
Chinese provinces over the period of 1990 and 1999, the author analyzed the impact of financial 
sector development on economic growth using the GMM system estimator. Credit extended by 
the financial sector at the province level had a statistically insignificant negative effect on a 
province’s economic growth. In other words, the financial deepening in China did not increase 
provincial economic growth despite evidence that financial development in China contributed to 
its national economic performance. 
 Zhang et al. (2012) assessed even greater fragmentation of financial markets at the city 
level. Based on a dataset of 286 Chinese cities between 2001 and 2006, Zhang et al. (2012) 
analyzed the impact of financial development on economic growth by applying traditional first-
differenced and system GMM estimators. The Chinese dataset does not allow calculation of 
traditional indicators of financial development such as the ratio of credits extended by financial 
intermediaries to private sector to GDP at the city level. Thus, the authors employed the 
following indicators to measure financial development: 1) the ratio of total loans to GDP to 
measure financial depth; 2) the ratio of total deposits to GDP to capture the size of financial 
intermediaries; 3) the ratio of total household savings to GDP to measure the degree of 
household saving mobilization; 4) the ratio of fixed asset investment by domestic loans to 
investment by state government to capture the substitution of more market and profit oriented 
financial transactions for state government to allocate capital more efficiently; and 5) the ratio of 
deposits by firm to total deposits in financial system to measure how financial development 
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contributes to provide banking service to corporations. Their results suggested that financial 
development has a positive impact on economic growth. In other words, financial deepening, as 
measured by the size and depth of the financial sector, contributed to Chinese economic growth, 
and financial development after WTO entry spurred economic growth in China. However, Law 
and Singh (2014) found that financial development has a negative impact on economic growth 
after a certain threshold level. In other words, the relationship between financial development 
and growth is contingent on the level of financial development, where financial development 
increases economic growth after a level of financial development surpasses a certain threshold 
level. They suggested innovative dynamic panel threshold technique to investigate the 
association between finance and economic growth based on 87 developed and developing 
countries for the period 1980 to 2010. Their empirical findings indicated that the degree of 
financial development has a positive impact on economic growth only up to a certain threshold. 
After a certain threshold, further financial development has a negative impact on economic 
growth.  
 
1.4 Financial Development and Inequality 
1.4.1 Theoretical Framework on Financial Development and Inequality 
 Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) introduced a non-linear relationship between financial 
development and inequality, which indicates an inverted U-shaped curve – at the early stage of 
financial development, due to limited access of credits to poor people, income disparities 
increase, and then after a certain stage, financial development decreases income disparities. The 
authors set up a model where financial development can enable people to access the information 
on risky investment by acquiring and analyzing information so that the development of financial 
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intermediations can contribute to diversify risk of the investment. Moreover, in their model, the 
cost of joining a financial intermediary is fixed, whereas financial intermediaries take advantage 
of economies of scale in screening projects. Resource allocation efficiency can be promoted by 
joining the financial intermediary to stimulate economic growth. In a sense, economic growth 
occurs when more people are able to access financial intermediaries, allowing them access to 
higher expected return projects. Under this condition above, financial development affects the 
relationship between growth and income distribution. The inverted U-shaped hypothesis tells us 
the following. At low levels of economic development where financial development is less 
mature in their early developmental stage, fewer people are able to join financial intermediaries 
since the fixed costs to join are high. Thus, economic development is slow and income inequality 
is quite small. If financial sectors are quite well developed (more developed than at the early 
stage) in the middle of the developmental stage, economic growth is faster and income inequality 
increases more than the early stage of financial development. Lastly, if financial development is 
fully mature at the maturity level, income inequality will decrease again because more people 
can enjoy the full range of benefits from a formal financial system and be quite stable at the end. 
In summary, based on the inverted U-shaped hypothesis suggested by Greenwood and Jovanovic 
(1990), at the early stage of economic development, financial development increases income 
inequality. However, as the country reaches a stage where more low-income people have easier 
access to credit, income inequality will decrease.  
 Liang’s (2006) empirical analysis provides strong evidence to the linear hypothesis 
(Banerjee & Newman, 1993; Galor & Zeira, 1993). The theoretical model by Galor and Zeira 
(1993) studied the relationship between income distribution and macroeconomics by investment 
in human capital. Under the assumption that the credit market is imperfect, the wealth 
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distribution affects aggregate output and investment activities in human capital in the short run. 
For this result to be effective in the long run as well, the authors added an element of non-
convexity to their theoretical model, which refers to indivisibility in investment in human capital. 
When credit markets are imperfect and a fixed cost connected with schooling is high, only rich 
dynasties are able to invest in their human capital. Thus, an imperfect financial market system 
hinders the poor from accumulating human capital. 
 In the face of a credit market’s imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human 
capital, the wealth distribution in conjunction with financial market imperfection influences 
aggregate levels of human capital and aggregate output level. If wealth distribution is not quite 
equal, fewer individuals accumulate human capital so that it will decrease aggregate efficiency 
and, thus, economic growth. In the existence of financial market imperfections, economic growth 
in the long run and the persistence of inequality depend on the initial wealth distribution. The 
theoretical model by Galor and Zeira (1993) shows that credit accessibility will increase as a 
financial market develops. As more low-income people are able to borrow money to invest in 
their human capital, economic growth increases and inequality is reduced.    
 As a recent theoretical work on financial development and inequality, Bumann and 
Lensink (2016) developed a tractable model that portrays the relationship between agents having 
different investment abilities and banking sectors. As two possible interventions, which liberalize 
the banking sector, this tractable model introduces an increase in the size of foreign investments 
and a decrease in reserve requirements, which can be utilized to raise domestic loans. The 
efficiency of banking sector and the adjustments of interest rates, which influence agents with 
varying investment abilities, can be improved by financial liberalization or financial depth. Their 
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tractable model suggests that financial liberalization will decrease income disparities when 
financial depth is high.  
 
1.4.2 Empirical Evidence on Financial Development and Inequality 
 As discussed above, theoretical models for the linear and inverted U-shaped hypotheses 
have distinct predictions for the link between financial development and income inequality. 
Clarke et al. (2003) explored the relationship between financial development and income 
inequality using a dataset of 91 countries over the period 1960 to 1995. They found strong 
support for an inverse linear association between financial development and income inequality, 
which is the linear hypothesis suggested by Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Galor and Zeira 
(1993). They did not support the inverted-U shaped hypothesis since the coefficients of the 
squared term for the financial development measures were not statistically significant. 
Incidentally, their main findings provide some supportive evidence for an augmented Kuznets 
hypothesis, where the industrial structure (industrial, agricultural, service sectors) is necessary to 
explain the association between economic development and income inequality. The authors’ 
conclusion was that financial development may decrease income inequality since the coefficients 
of financial development indicators were negative and statistically significant.  
 Wei and Wu (2001) studied the association between urban-rural income inequality and 
the degree of openness in trade using 100 Chinese cities over the period from 1988 to 1993. The 
authors constructed the urban-rural income ratio to measure income disparity between urban and 
rural areas and used a ratio of total export to GDP to measure the degree of openness at the city 
level rather than the aggregate of urban and rural due to data limitation. The empirical findings 
suggested that Chinese cities having a higher ratio of trade to the GDP tended to reduce the 
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urban-rural income disparity.  
Next, domestic income disparity in China, which differs from a cross-country analysis of 
income disparity, is discussed. Tsui (1993) decomposed Chinese regional disparities into five 
different categories: within-province level, inter-province level, within rural level, urban and 
rural, and within-urban inequality. Based on 2306 counties and cities in 1982, the author used 
gross value of industrial and agricultural outputs, infant mortality rate, and illiteracy rate to 
capture various aspects of regional disparities. The findings indicate that the inequality of within-
province level is dominant sources of regional inequalities.  
 Liang (2006) tested the two theoretical hypotheses on the link between the financial 
development and income inequality based on the system Generalized Method of Moment 
(GMM) estimator. Empirical results support the linear hypothesis that the development of the 
financial sector decreases urban income inequality. All measures of financial development were 
significant with the expected signs. After adding the squared terms of the financial variables into 
the model to test the inverted U-shaped hypothesis, the financial measures were not statistically 
significant, which does not support the inverted U-shaped hypothesis by Greenwood and 
Jovanovic. In conclusion, after the Chinese government launched radical urban reforms, the 
development in the financial sector triggered a decrease in income inequality.  
 According to Liang (2006), financial development significantly reduced income 
inequality in China. However, it is still controversial whether financial development helps to 
decrease income disparity in China. First of all, many significant reforms and institutional 
innovations in the financial sector occurred between 1995 and 2010. The Chinese financial 
system solidified after the Chinese government announced the Central Bank Law and the 
Commercial Bank Law in 1995. Large money injections occurred in 1998 to relieve the heavy 
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debt of four major state-owned banks and in 2003 to restructure state-owned banks to joint-stock 
commercial banks with stock market public listings. When China joined the WTO, its banking 
system was required to be fully open to foreign competitors by 2006. Therefore, we need to 
investigate the recent Chinese data covering the late 1990s and early 2000s to the present, which 
captures an important moment in Chinese banking sectors’ reform after WTO entry.  
 Li, Squire, and Zou (1998) found that cross-country variations of inequalities were 
significantly larger than within-country variations of inequalities. They used a dataset on Gini 
coefficients of 2,480 observations covering 112 developed and developing countries from 1947 
to 1994. They also examined the determinants of income inequality, looking at policies that are 
beneficial to the rich but may not be favorable to the poor, and imperfections in credit markets. 
The authors adjusted the data to achieve a more balanced panel dataset and observed that well-
equipped financial markets reduce income disparity.   
 Similarly, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2004) examine that well-developed 
financial sectors decrease poverty. They first tested whether a developed financial system 
influences the income of each economy’s poorest 20%. Second, the authors investigate the 
association between financial development and changes in income distribution. Lastly, they 
introduced direct measures of poverty alleviation (the growth rate of the fraction of the 
population living under $1 per day), testing whether the developed financial system affects 
poverty alleviation positively or negatively. Using an 82 cross-country sample over the period 
from 1960 to 1999, they discovered that a developed financial system decreases income 
inequality after controlling for real GDP growth per capita. Second, a developed financial system 
decreases the percentage of the population living on less than $1 a day, suggesting that a 
developed financial system alleviates the poverty rate. Unlike the previous research above, the 
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main contribution of the paper by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2004) was the examination 
of the aggregate relationship between financial development and both income disparity and the 
decrease in poverty. However, its limitation was that private credit, a commonly used indicator 
for financial development, was the only available measure of financial development since other 
traditional indicators were not available across countries. In this light, Wei and Wu (2001) and 
Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) argued that cross-country analyses on income disparity are less 
credible due to the lack of data and processing methodology.   
 Whether financial development increases or decreases income inequality is still 
ambiguous. The following literature unquestionably illustrates that Chinese economic transition 
and financial development is urban-centered and urban-favored, consequently, deepening the 
income gap between urban and rural areas. Chinese economic transition, especially in the 
financial market condition, is very much associated with changes in urban income distribution. 
For example, according to Wei and Wang (1997) and Zhang et al. (2003), since a well-equipped 
financial system played a pivotal role in the process of reforming the Chinese economy and 
restructuring state owned firms, urban-oriented developments in the banking sector are inevitable. 
 Wei and Wang (1997) examined the link between state-owned banks (SOBs) and state-
owned manufacturing enterprises (SOEs) using 370 Chinese cities for 1986, 1989, 1990, and 
1991 provided by the Urban Statistical Yearbook of China. First, they used a simple regression 
model to examine whether the effectiveness of fiscal and other economic reforms are negatively 
correlated with the degree of SOBs’ lending bias toward SOEs. They found that loans from the 
Chinese banking sector are biased in favor of SOEs. Chinese cities with a higher share of SOEs 
in industrial output are more likely to have greater volume of loans after controlling for city size, 
capital intensity, and the ratio of loan to output.  
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 In another example of financial development associated with changes in urban-rural 
income distribution, Qi et al. (2003) discussed the impact of financial development on urban and 
rural income disparity using a panel dataset of Chinese 28 provinces over the period of 1978 to 
1998. The authors used the ratio of urban to rural per capita net income as the dependent variable 
and used the ratio of total loans to provincial GDP as an indicator of financial development. 
Controlling for the infrastructure in each province, institutional reforms in rural areas, and the 
degree of international integration, they discovered that as the ratio of total loans to provincial 
GDP increased, the income gap between urban and rural areas in China widened significantly. 
They argued that urban-favored regulations and interventions on the rural economy caused urban 
bias of credit allocation in China’s financial development. This finding clearly indicates that 
financial development in China increases income disparity. Recently, Furceri and Loungani 
(2015) investigated the relationship between financial depth and income inequality based on 
cross-country dataset for 149 countries between 1970 and 2010. The authors found that financial 
depth measured by capital account liberalization increases income inequality in countries where 
the level of financial development is low. Likewise, Li and Yu (2014) found that financial 
deepening measured by the ratio of credit to GDP increases income inequality based on panel 
data for 18 Asian countries from 1996 and 2005. In addition, Denk and Cournede (2015) argued 
that the size of finance measured by intermediated credit and stock market capitalization has a 
positively significant impact on income inequality in the sample data of 33 OECD countries. In 
addition, recent literature (Jauch & Watzka, 2016) found positive impact of financial 
development, which is measured by credit to GDP, on income inequality, which is measured by 
the Gini coefficient. Their analysis was based on an unbalanced dataset of 138 developed and 
developing countries between 1960 and 2008. After controlling for GDP per capita and country 
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fixed effects, their empirical findings reject theoretical models suggesting a negative impact of 
financial development on income disparities, and their results are consistent with the alternative 
specifications with different indicators of financial development. In contrast, Bumann and 
Lensink (2016) discussed theoretical and empirical relationships between financial liberalization 
and income inequality. The theoretical model set up by the authors suggests that financial 
liberalization increases the efficiency of banking sectors and adjusts interest rates, which 
influence investors and savers’ income and, therefore, leads to a reduction in income inequality. 
Their empirical results indicate that financial liberalization measured only by capital account 
liberalization decreases income inequality in countries where financial depth measured by the 
ratio of private credit to GDP is more than 25%.  
 
1.5 Conclusion 
 Theoretically, financial development enhances economic development since well-
developed financial intermediaries trigger investments and savings. This is because well-
developed financial systems decrease the cost of transaction and producing information, improve 
monitoring investment activities, enable individuals to diversify possible risk from their 
investments, and help to mobilize investment and savings, which is required for economic 
growth. Existing empirical evidence supports these claims. Furthermore, most empirical research 
in China also supports the hypothesis that financial development has a positive impact on 
economic growth. However, it is still unclear whether financial intermediary development 
reduces income inequality, although it is quite evident that financial development stimulates the 
rate of economic growth. In general, theoretically and empirically, financial development 
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provides more economic opportunities, which reduces income disparities and the number of 
people living below the poverty line. However, some cross-sectional analyses indicate that the 
effects of financial development on economic growth or income inequality differ by income 
level of the country.  
 Another important issue is policies. Little research exists on the trend of income 
inequality with financial sector policies implemented after entrance into the WTO. More work on 
the relationship between financial policies and the pattern of income inequality is needed for 
economies at different stages of economic development. In particular, the Chinese government 
has actively adopted several financial policies such as liberalization of the interest rate, 
relaxation of regulation on foreign banks, and mitigation of restrictions on ownership takeovers, 
after joining the WTO in 2001. China’s policy implementations are very unique, making it 
difficult to generalize previous literature. Thus, in the Chinese case, more empirical work on the 
association between financial policies and the trend of income inequality is needed, especially in 
the time period after joining the WTO.  
 Lastly, an important reform policy was the designation of special economic zones in the 
coastal area to draw foreign direct investments and international trade. As China’s economic 
reforms progress, the coastal provinces are far ahead of the inland provinces with respect to the 
accumulation of human capital and infrastructure facilities. Therefore, the developmental gap 
between the coastal and inland provinces has widened. In 2011, the average annual income from 
Eastern provinces was 82,128 (Yuan), while those from Central and Western provinces are 
34,134 (Yuan) and 31,854 (Yuan), respectively. Future research should explore the spatial 
association between financial development and income inequality. This will complement the 
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existing body of studies by considering the spatial autocorrelation of errors and spatial lag 
dependences in the association between financial development and income inequality in China.   
 Research on the interactions between economic growth, financial development, and 
income inequality assists policy makers in shaping future policy. Future studies need to consider 
their dynamic interactions, especially for countries that are facing or undergoing financial system 



















2. Financial Development and Income Inequality: Evidence from a Chinese Dataset  




 Over the past decade, the Gini coefficient in China exceeded the warning threshold of 0.4 
while quickly developing its economy. Moreover, the overall Chinese Gini index steadily 
increased from 0.46 to 0.495 from 2005 to 2015. In 2008, inequality of income distribution in 
China peaked (0.491) due to the global financial crisis. According to The World Factbook issued 
by the Central Intelligence Agency, China’s inequality level was ranked 27th among the world’s 
worst countries in 2014.  
While Chinese government reformation policies triggered enormous economic growth at 
an average annual rate of 10% and liberated more than 600 million people from absolute poverty, 
income inequality in China is at a near standstill during swiftly expanding economies. To reduce 
income disparities, China’s State Council promised to enhance social security using the 
following policies: “double personal income by 2020 and raise minimum wage,” “interest rate 
liberalization,” “state-owned enterprise dividend payments,” “restrictions on government 
officials’ income,” “tax reforms,” “land rights,” “residence permit system,” and “social safety net” 
(Salidjanova, 2013). However, the effect of these economic policies is also accompanied by 
adverse impacts on inequality (Liang, 2009).  
 A surge in income inequality in China received much attention from academic 
researchers as well as policy makers (Kanbur and Zhang, 2005; Wan and Zhou, 2005; Tsui, 2007; 
Wan et al., 2007). In addition, Rey and Montouri (1999) and Le Gallo and Ertur (2003) argued 
																																																								
5 Distribution of family income - Gini index, The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, accessed on 
November 24, 2011 
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for the need for a regional analysis accompanied by spatial heterogeneity and regional income 
inequalities. China’s economic reforms were successful in moving China from a planned 
economy to a socialist market and spurred impressive rates of economic growth. In each stage of 
economic development so far, some specific cities, provinces, and regions received more 
opportunities for growth and development while creating inequalities. Thus, it is important to 
define the types of income inequality that a country has and to find country specific determinants 
of income inequality. Wei and Ye (2009) defined types of income inequality in China ─ 
interregional inequality (Eastern, Central, and Western regions divided by administrative units), 
interprovincial inequality (provinces), and intra-provincial inequality (urban and rural, inter-
cities, or inter-counties). Issues on income inequality in China have been researched at the 
county, city, province, and regional level. Using country-level data between 1997 and 2007 and 
applying a decomposition technique, Cheong and Wu (2012) found that 63% of the rise in 
overall national inequality resulted from an increase in income inequality within provinces across 
the country. In addition, the findings from their decomposition technique indicated income 
disparities in the Central and Western provinces are due to the aggravation of inter-county 
inequality, while inequality in the Eastern provinces are from inter-city inequality. Therefore, I 
utilized a provincial level dataset to investigate the determinants of income disparities in China. 
Table 2.1: Financial Development in China: 1998 - 2014 
Year M2/ GDP Deposits / GDP Loans / GDP 
1998 1.23 1.12 1.02 
1999 1.32 1.20 1.04 
2000 1.34 1.23 0.99 
2001 1.43 1.30 1.01 
2002 1.52 1.40 1.08 
2003 1.61 1.51 1.16 
2004 1.57 1.49 1.10 
2005 1.59 1.53 1.04 
2006 1.57 1.53 1.03 
2007 1.49 1.44 0.97 
2008 1.49 1.46 0.95 
2009 1.75 1.71 1.14 
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2010 1.76 1.74 1.16 
2011 1.74 1.65 1.12 
2012 1.80 1.70 1.17 
2013 1.86 1.75 1.21 
2014 1.91 1.77 1.27 
           Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbooks from 1998 to 2014. 
 China’s financial markets have grown quickly in the past 20 years. Table 2.1 illustrates 
the general indicators of M2/GDP, Deposits/GDP, and Loans/GDP to gauge the level of financial 
development. The ratio of M2 to GDP increased from 1.23 in 1998 to 1.91 in 2014. The ratio of 
deposits to GDP climbed considerably to 1.77 in 2014, while the ratio of loan to GDP increased 
to 1.27 in 2014. Most authors agree that financial intermediation positively affects economic 
growth in the long run, since a well developed financial system increases savings, diversifies 
risks, stimulates exchange, and monitors managers. However, the relationship between financial 
development and inequality remains ambiguous. This relationship can be classified into three 
different perspectives. First, a well-developed financial system may benefit the rich and worsen 
income disparities because it is not easy for poor people, who do not have enough collateral or 
accumulated wealth, to finance. As a result, financial intermediaries can be beneficial toward the 
rich, who have enough wealth (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Thus, financial development leads to 
an increase in income inequality.  
Another view argues that financial development stimulates economic growth and then 
reduces income inequality. In this view, there are some different channels for the relationship 
between financial development and income inequality. First, if the financial system is not well 
developed and, thus, it is difficult for the poor to finance, they may have difficulties to 
accumulate human capital (Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997; Baland and Robinson, 1998). From this 
perspective, the well-developed financial system, which enables the poor to access credit, will 
contribute to the deduction in income inequality. Second, if the financial system matures, it will 
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promote financial market competition and, therefore, the poor can access credit with less cost 
(Black and Strahan, 2002; Kerr and Nanda, 2007, Levine, Levkov and Rubinstein, 2009). Lastly, 
if the financial system is well developed, small and medium-sized enterprises, which hire more 
people than large enterprises, gain more benefit so that higher demand for less skilled labor 
results from the development of small and medium-sized enterprises. Thus, income inequality 
will decrease since the demand for less skilled labor increases, resulting in an increase in their 
wage (Beck et al, 2008).      
 Lastly, some theories indicate that a well-developed financial system reduces income 
inequality (Geenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 
1993). Many empirical studies support the negative association between financial development 
and income inequality (Clarke et al., 2003; Li, Squire, and Zou, 1998; Beck et al., 2004). After 
the global financial crisis of 2008, however, the relationship between financial development and 
income inequality became controversial again, and many people questioned whether well-
developed financial markets benefit or harm a nation’s economy overall. Recently, some 
empirical work showed that financial development widens income disparities (Jauch and 
Watzka, 2016; Wang, 2012). Interestingly, Beck et al. (2014) tested how credit expansion affects 
economic growth based on cross-sectional data from 132 countries from 1980 to 2005. Their 
findings suggest that financial development has a positive effect on economic growth at a certain 
point and, after achieving a certain point, the positive impacts of financial development on 
economic growth disappear. In addition, the authors found that non-linearity between financial 
development and economic growth disappears after controlling for structural features such as 
stock market capitalization, bank credit to deposits, and banking crisis dummy. 
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 Although the literature provides evidence that financial development plays an important 
role in income disparities, it has diverse points of views. Using a recent provincial level dataset, I 
investigated recent income inequality and examined the relationship between financial 
development and income inequality. I extended the existing literature on financial development 
and inequality in China by using a larger and more recent dataset covering 1998 to 2014. The 
research results below show that an increase in recent income inequality in China is positively 
associated with financial development. I explored these issues in depth in the following sections. 
Section 2 reviews theoretical and empirical literature from a broad perspective on finance and 
inequality; Section 3 describes the data used for this work; Section 4 develops the empirical 
model used; Section 5 presents and analyzes the estimation results; and Section 6 presents 
conclusions and discussion on areas for further research.  
 
2.2 Background and Various Measurements 
2.2.1 Literature Overview 
 Extensive literature on the relationship between economic development and income 
inequality has its roots in the inverted U-shaped hypothesis introduced by Kuznets (1955). 
According to Kuznets, in the early stages of industrialization income inequality between urban 
and rural areas rises but subsequently falls, which is captured by an inverted U-shape. When a 
young generation delivered by a poor old generation is born in urbanized areas, the newborn 
generation will benefit from urbanization; for example, there is a higher chance of employment 
than in rural areas. When income per capita achieves a certain point because of a new industrial 
system, such as the emergence of welfare and democratization, income inequality of urban and 
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rural areas is predicted to be lower. In this sense, Kuznets suggested that the level of income 
inequality can be captured by an inverted U-shaped. 
Another possible benefit from urbanization is financial development, which enables 
people born into families with a lack of inherited wealth to invest into their human capital or to 
initiate a new business. Financial development is initially positively associated with economic 
growth, since well-developed financial markets improve the efficiency of capital allocation and 
relieve borrowing constraints. Subsequently, since economic growth is positively related to the 
creation of more jobs in labor markets, income per capita increases and income inequality 
decreases. Therefore, financial development is negatively associated with income inequality. The 
Kuznets inverted U-shaped hypothesis has influenced theoretical frameworks to investigate the 
interactions between finance, growth, and inequality (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and 
Zeira, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Piketty, 1997; Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt, 2000).  
 There are three classic theoretical studies on the topic of financial development and 
income inequality (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and 
Zeira, 1993). Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) suggested an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between financial development and income inequality. Namely, if financial markets are less 
developed in the early developmental stage, income inequality increases. In the middle stage of 
development, if financial markets are better developed than the early stage, economic growth 
accelerates and income inequality is greater than the early stage of financial development. 
However, if financial and economic development reaches a certain level, more developed 
financial markets improve the accessibility for credit for low-income people, leading to more 
income possibilities and a reduction in income inequality. Banerjee and Newman (1993) and 
Galor and Zeira (1993) suggested a linear hypothesis where a more developed financial system 
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decreases income disparities. Banerjee and Newman (1993) assumed that an increase in credit 
accessibility would affect people’s occupational choice while Galor and Zeira (1993) assumed 
that an increase in credit accessibility would affect human capital investment. Recently, 
Townsend and Ueda (2006) proposed another theoretical association among economic growth, 
financial development, and income inequality using a different assumption regarding 
technologies and preferences, arguing that their association is not monotonic but complex 
enough to have a non-linear relationship. Subsequently, Jeong and Townsend (2007, 2008) 
stressed the role of financial frictions, which influence people’s chances to be entrepreneurs or 
choices in jobs, as a function of income inequality. When fixed costs related to being an 
entrepreneur exist, investment returns to physical capital is family specific; therefore, if financial 
market frictions are present, the initial wealth distribution affects the family that is able to 
acquire funding for launching a new business. Lastly, Beck et al. (2009) investigated the effect of 
bank branching regulations on income disparities. The main findings indicate that deregulation 
on branching restrictions lead to a reduction in income disparities. According to their arguments, 
if large banks are not properly regulated, banking fees or transaction costs would increase and, 
thus, restrict economic opportunities for the poor. As a result, deregulation on branching 
restrictions increase income disparities. 
In general, the theories consistently state that financial development reduces income 
inequality, even though these theories differ in assumptions concerning technologies, preferences, 
financial market frictions, human capital, and investment opportunities. In testing the linear and 
inverted U-shaped hypotheses discussed above, numerous researchers found that income 
inequality is negatively associated with financial development (Beck et al., 2004; Clarke et al., 
2003; Li, Squire, and Zou, 1998; Liang, 2006; Shahbaz and Islam, 2011). Using 112 developed 
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and developing countries between 1947 and 1994, Li, Squire, and Zou (1998) looked into the 
causes of income disparities within countries and found that better equipped or developed 
financial markets led to a reduction in income disparities. Clarke et al. (2003) examined whether 
better-developed financial markets increase or decrease income disparities using 91 countries 
between 1960 and 1995. Their empirical findings strongly support a negative association 
between financial development and income inequality as suggested by Banerjee and Newman 
(1993) and Galor and Zeira (1993), but did not support the inverted-U shaped hypothesis since 
none of the coefficients on the squared terms of the financial development measures were 
statistically significant. Applying GMM, Liang (2006) tested a linear and an inverted U-shaped 
hypothesis to analyze the association between financial development and income disparities with 
China’s dataset during post-economic transition in China. The empirical findings revealed that 
financial development significantly decreased income inequality in China between 1986 and 
2000. Surprisingly, empirical analysis by Liang strongly supports a linear hypothesis (Banerjee 
and Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993), but does not give any strong support to an inverted 
U-shaped hypothesis (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). In recent research, Wang (2012) found 
that financial development reduces income inequality using a dataset covering 31 Chinese 
provinces from 1981 to 2008. Using the ratio of the average income of urban residents to the 
average income of rural residents as the dependent variable, Wang found that financial 
development in China decreased urban and rural income disparities. Shahbaz and Islam (2011) 
explored the link between financial deepening and income inequality using a Pakistani dataset 
from 1971 to 2005. They applied an error correction model for short run effects and the Auto 
Regressive Distributed Lag for long run effects and discovered that financial development in 
Pakistan decreased income inequality.   
	 42	
 However, some recent empirical studies indicate a positive association between financial 
development and income disparities (Chen et al., 2010; Jauch and Watzka, 2016). Chen et al. 
(2010) investigated the relationship between financial intermediation and income disparities of 
urban and rural areas in China using a panel dataset between 1978 and 1998. Examining the sub-
periods of 1978-1989 and 1990-1998, they found a negative relationship between financial 
development and income disparities from 1978 to 1989, but the disparities between urban and 
rural areas widened from 1990 to 1998. Jauch and Watzka (2016) analyzed a broader and more 
comprehensive cross-country dataset covering 138 developed and developing countries between 
1960 and 2008. After handling possible endogeneity problems, they observed that countries with 
more developed financial markets increased income inequality.   
As described above, empirical findings on financial development and income inequality 
are controversial while theories agree in their conclusion using different assumptions. There is 
still too little empirical examination on suggested theories due to a lack of data to measure 
financial development. Next, I discuss the indicators of financial development from previous 
empirical studies.  
 
2.2.2 The Measurements of Financial Development  
 Compared to other developing countries, the financial system in China is mainly a bank-
oriented financial system.  Beck et al. (2000) introduced three traditional indicators of banking 
sector development, defined as follows. First, since the degree of financial development has a 
positive relationship with the volume of the financial intermediaries, the degree of financial 
development may be measured by using the ratio of liquid liabilities to gross domestic product 
(GDP). A second indicator of financial development is the ratio of commercial bank to total bank 
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assets. It measures how much commercial banks contribute to total bank assets. Commercial 
banks, including private and foreign owned ones, work better than state-owned banks in terms of 
allocating financial resources. The third indicator of financial intermediation is the ratio of total 
private sector credit to GDP. Financial intermediaries with higher volumes of credit to the 
private sector are more involved in financial development such as managing and diversifying 
risk, saving mobilization, and facilitating transactions, allocating these funding to economic 
activities and monitoring borrower’s activities.     
    However, for a within-country analysis on Chinese provincial financial development, 
these three indicators are not available. Therefore, Boyreau-Debray (2003) created alternative 
indicators of financial intermediation to investigate the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth, as he used a provincial dataset over the period between 1990 
and 1999. Chinese provincial data does not allow financial development indicators to be 
calculated traditionally, such as the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, the ratio of commercial 
bank assets to commercial bank and central banks assets, and the ratio of credit to the private 
sector to GDP. Thus, I introduced two more indicators in order to measure financial 
intermediation ─ the ratio of loans to deposits of state-owned banks as a proxy for central bank 
lending to the provinces and the ratio of state-owned bank’s credit to GDP. Because of the 
limitation with data collection, in my paper I adopted the indicator of the ratio of total deposits to 
provincial GDP employed by Boyreau-Debray (2003) and Wang (2012) since the Chinese 
provincial statistical yearbook promptly reports total deposits by financial institution and 
regional GDP. My second indicator of financial development, the share of financial sector in 
provincial GDP, was taken from Liang (2006). Another indicator of financial development I 
included was the ratio of total loan to provincial GDP suggested by Chen et al. (2010).  
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2.2.3 Various Measures of Income Inequality  
 The Gini coefficient derived from the Lorenz curve measures income inequality in the 
dispersion of market-based income. This is the most general and popular way to measure income 
inequality, but it is easily influenced by high values. The Gini coefficient is calculated as 
     (1)
 
where xi is the wealth or income of person i, and n is the number of people.  
 There are a number of alternative indices, which allow researchers to have a nuanced 
understanding of income disparity. One popular alternative index is the Coefficient of Variation 
(CV). Its disadvantage is that it is sensitive to outliers.  
    (2)
 
where yi is the real per capita GDP of province i; N is the number of provinces in China; and y 
bar is the mean of yi. This index is often referred to as the un-weighted CV, which is different 
from the weighted CV that weights the deviation of each province by its population. CV can be 
viewed as an estimator of the disparity among individuals nationwide (Lyons, 1992; Fujita and 
Hu, 2001). Since my paper focuses on regional inequality, the un-weighted CV is preferred. 
 Unlike CV and the Gini coefficient, the Theil index can be decomposed into additive 
terms that describe income inequality among and within groups of elements in a country (Theil, 
1967). However, Galbraith and Hale (2005) and Shorrocks (2006) found that the Theil index is 
reflected more by observations with low incomes. The Theil index is calculated as 
G =
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where xi is the proportion of the population of province i to the national population and yi is the 
proportion of GDP of the province i to the national GDP. It is not clear which income inequality 
measure is preferred. However, Dong (2006) and Kanbur and Zhang (2005) found that the Theil 
index is more popular in the analysis of Chinese regional income inequality.  
 In this paper, I first use the Gini coefficient because China’s National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS) immediately reports the Gini coefficient. When the Theil index at the provincial level is 
available, it can be utilized for comparative analysis. While the methodology to calculate the 
Gini coefficients is diverse, I used the Gini coefficients from the Urban Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey (UHIES) undertaken by China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).  
 
2.3 Economic Traits of China6 
2.3.1 Data Description 
 A panel dataset of 29 administrative units in China (21 provinces, 4 municipalities, and 4 
autonomous regions) during the period from 1998 to 2014 was constructed to study the impact of 
financial development on income disparities. The data were taken from the Chinese Statistical 
Yearbook, each province’s statistical yearbook, and the Almanac of China’s Finance and 
Banking published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. In addition, the Gini 
coefficients (the dependent variable of my empirical model) of each Chinese province were 
taken from the Urban Household Income and Expenditure Survey (UHIES) undertaken by 
																																																								
6 The data are from the Chinese Statistical Yearbook, Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking, Statistical 
Yearbook of Xinjiang production and Construction corps, and Statistical Yearbook of Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, 
Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Shandong, Jiangsu, Anhui, Shanghai, 
Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Xinjiang, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Chongqing, 
Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan. (1998-2014) 





China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Gini coefficients of five provinces (Hunan, Jilin, 
Shandong, Tianjin, and Yunnan)7 are missing, however, because these provinces do not provide 
packet data of income of individuals. I investigated the relationship between financial 
development and income inequality across China using a provincial dataset based on three 
economic regions followed by the Seventh Five-Year Plan, which is commonly used for regional 
inequality in China (Fan, 1995; Lee, 2000; Wei, 2000). As shown on Figure 2.1, the Western 
region includes six provinces (Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan), one 
municipality (Chongqing), and three autonomous regions (Ningxia, Tibet, and Xinjiang). The 
Central region includes eight provinces (Anhui, Henan, Heilongjiang, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, 
Jilin, and Shanxi) and one autonomous region (Inner Mongolia). The Eastern region includes 
eight provinces (Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, and 
Zhejiang), three municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin), and one autonomous region 
(Guangxi). Tibet is often omitted in income inequality studies according to Zhang and Zhang 
(2003) and Chen (2006) because of serious missing values and the lack of consistent GDP data; 
therefore, I also excluded Tibet from my analysis to avoid issues that may arise because of 
missing values.  
Figure 2.1: Provincial Units in China 
																																																								
7 Missing Gini coefficients: Hunan (2006 ~ 2014), Jilin and Shandong (2001 ~ 2014), Tianjin (2002~2014), Yunnan 
(2007 ~ 2014).  
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 Control variables included in the empirical model were provincial GDP per capita, 
international trade openness, and educational attainment to control for other factors that might 
affect income disparities at the provincial level (Table 2.2). First, provincial GDP per capita was 
added into the empirical model to control for the “Kuznets effect” of economic growth on 
income inequality. Li and Gibson (2012), however, investigated the recent problematic issue 
related to using a wrongly calculated GDP per capita. They found that some Chinese provinces 
recently changed to use GDP per resident, while some provinces are still using GDP per 
registered population. Thus, some people were double-counted because they were in the 
denominator of the statistics of GDP per capita for two or more places. In fact, Li and Gibson 
(2012) found that 26 million were double counted in recent statistics. In addition, Tsui (2007) 
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and Li and Gibson (2012) argued that GDP per capita is overinflated due to a surge in migration 
to richer provinces. Second, as shown in Liang’s (2006) empirical model, the variable of trade 
openness was employed to capture the provincial degree of integration to the world economy. 
Numerous papers have exploited the impact of trade globalization on income inequality but its 
impact on inequality is inconclusive (Winters, et al., 2004). Some papers argue that the degree of 
openness toward a world economy is related to a reduction in income inequality (Faustino and 
Vali, 2011; Jaumotte, et al., 2013). On the other hand, others support that trade liberalization 
leads to an increase in income inequality (Rudra and Haggard, 2001; Mah, 2013). Lastly, as 
suggested in previous literature, educational attainment was employed as a proxy for human 
capital, which is measured by the share of the provincial population with schooling of college 
and higher (Checchi, et al., 1999; Sylwester, 2002; Hendel, et al., 2005; Yang and Qiu, 2016).  
Table 2.2: Overview of Variables 
Variable Definition 
  
Dependent Variable  
Gini The Gini coefficient 
  
Financial Variables  
Financial intermediation / 
GDP 
Gross value added of the financial sector as a share of provincial GDP  
Financial intermediation: value-added of financial intermediation is the 
final results that are calculated at market prices and produced in a region 
during a given period by all resident units engaged in the financial sector.  
 
Deposit / GDP The ratio of total deposit to provincial GDP 
Total deposit is a form of credit by which firms, institutions, 
organizations, or households can put money into banks and other credit 
institutions. 
 
Loan / GDP The ratio of total loan to provincial GDP 
 Total loan is a form of credit by which banks and other credit institutions 
provide funds. 
 
Control Variables  
Gini (-1) The lagged variable of the Gini coefficient 
 
Ln (GDP per capita) The logarithm of provincial GDP / number of residents in the province 
 
 Openness The ratio of the sum of exports and imports to provincial GDP 
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 Education attainment  The number of people with more than secondary schooling as a share of 
the total population 
 
 In order for quantitative analysis to be conducted, quantitative measures of financial 
development need to be constructed. The depth, size, accessibility, and soundness of the 
financial sectors should be captured by the indicators of financial development. The 
measurements for financial development in this paper included: 1) the ratio of financial 
intermediation to provincial GDP; 2) the ratio of total deposits of the financial institutions to 
provincial GDP; and 3) the ratio of total loans of the financial institutions to provincial GDP. 
Since traditional indicators for financial development are not available for an analysis within a 
country, Boyreau-Debray (2003) developed local indicators of financial intermediation. For 
example, some applied the ratio of M2 (Money supply) to GDP to proxy for financial 
development, but M2 is not available at the provincial level in China. Thus, I borrowed one of 
these indicators, calculated as the ratio of total deposits of the financial institutions to GDP, to 
quantify the total size of the financial institutions. Secondly, the ratio of private credit to GDP 
was constructed by Beck et al. (2007) as an indicator of financial development. However, since 
data on private credit are not available, the ratio of loan extended by financial intermediation to 
provincial GDP was taken to measure financial intermediation development (Qi, et al., 2003). 
Lastly, based on the econometric model suggested by Liang (2003), I introduced an indicator of 
financial intermediation as the share of the financial industry in provincial GDP to measure how 
the financial markets are efficiently accessible. When financial markets are large enough, 
accessibility to financial markets increases. In turn, increased accessibility enables financial 
markets to provide reliable information that decreases transaction costs and, thus, boosts resource 
allocation efficiently.   
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 Table 2.3 displays the summary statistics for the dependent and control variables in this 
paper. Among the 24 provinces or municipalities, the average Gini coefficient was 0.435 in 2014 
(Table 2.4), relatively much higher than 0.3188, the average Gini coefficient for OECD countries. 
Its maximum value is 0.568 (Table 2.4), which is the Gini coefficient of the Guizhou province in 
western China in 2014. Surprisingly, as seen in Table 2.4, the averages of the Gini coefficient 
rose from 0.332 to 0.435 from 1998 to 2014, while the standard deviations of the Gini coefficient 
increased from 0.047 to 0.071. In addition, the maximum values of Gini coefficients was only 
0.410 in 1998 but increased to 0.568 in 2014, while the minimum values of the Gini coefficients 
are quite stable, from  0.229 in 1998 to 0.285 in 2014. Clearly, this shows that the level of 
income inequality in China has been on the rise, even though Table 2.1 indicates rapid financial 
development in China. Similarly, the average provincial GDP per capita was 7403.8 Yuan per 
person in 1998, but climbed to 50876.9 Yuan per capita in 2014, with an increase in standard 
deviation from 5245.39 in 1998 to 21153.27 in 2014 (Table 2.5). 
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean STD Min 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile Max 
Gini 0.397 0.060 0.229 0.359 0.396 0.440 0.568 
Lgdp_ca 9.72 0.845 7.768 9.038 9.725 10.415 11.513 
Open 0.332 0.461 0.031 0.078 0.130 0.388 4.657 
Edu 0.116 0.096 0.008 0.045 0.093 0.155 0.509 
F_gdp 0.048 0.034 0.006 0.030 0.038 0.054 0.431 
D_gdp 1.476 0.756 0.709 1.102 1.334 1.604 10.356 
L_gdp 1.085 0.506 0.378 0.829 1.019 1.236 8.706 
Note: The number of observations is 408 for raw variables. 
 
Table 2.4: Details of the Gini coefficient 
 Mean STD Min 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile Max 
1998 0.332 0.046 0.229 0.300 0.332 0.362 0.410 
1999 0.346 0.044 0.248 0.317 0.351 0.369 0.421 
2000 0.370 0.053 0.256 0.345 0.362 0.411 0.456 
2001 0.381 0.054 0.270 0.348 0.374 0.423 0.466 
2002 0.394 0.055 0.265 0.368 0.389 0.439 0.478 
2003 0.404 0.054 0.267 0.362 0.412 0.437 0.483 
2004 0.398 0.052 0.289 0.359 0.399 0.433 0.483 
																																																								
8 Source: OECD Income Distribution Database (IDD): Gini, poverty, income, Methods and Concepts 
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2005 0.403 0.048 0.280 0.380 0.404 0.432 0.478 
2006 0.406 0.050 0.276 0.382 0.404 0.441 0.490 
2007 0.406 0.052 0.280 0.381 0.401 0.445 0.491 
2008 0.408 0.049 0.296 0.377 0.409 0.444 0.486 
2009 0.408 0.049 0.290 0.381 0.410 0.436 0.484 
2010 0.394 0.049 0.274 0.371 0.393 0.421 0.476 
2011 0.421 0.066 0.275 0.361 0.438 0.471 0.513 
2012 0.417 0.060 0.281 0.375 0.424 0.456 0.508 
2013 0.429 0.068 0.294 0.376 0.446 0.479 0.536 
2014 0.435 0.071 0.285 0.385 0.451 0.480 0.568 
Note: The number of observations is 24 for each year. 
Table 2.5: Details of Provincial GDP per capita 
 Mean STD Min 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile Max 
1998 7403.8 5245.39 2364 4320.0 5346.5 9509.0 25206 
1999 7896.1 5739.82 2545 4517.5 5628.0 10204.5 27071 
2000 8688.8 6376.14 2759 4962.0 6007.5 11185.5 29671 
2001 9491.9 6991.90 3000 5441.0 6546.5 11953.5 32201 
2002 10513.7 7831.49 3257 6017.5 7259.5 12969.0 35329 
2003 12032.3 8766.78 3701 6826.0 8771.5 14301.5 39128 
2004 14257.8 10317.41 4317 8342.0 10320.0 16152.0 46338 
2005 16451.0 11431.23 5052 9669.5 11963.0 18814.5 51474 
2006 18773.9 12590.27 5750 11216.0 13692.5 21477.0 57310 
2007 22518.5 14082.14 7878 13914.5 16814.0 26289.0 62041 
2008 26370.9 14900.59 9855 17160.5 20174.0 33304.0 66932 
2009 28382.8 15449.92 10971 18396.5 22197.0 37292.5 69165 
2010 33618.1 16745.58 13119 22684.0 27104.5 43545.5 76074 
2011 39732.1 18003.11 16413 27405.5 33253.5 50783.5 82560 
2012 43568.5 18711.82 19710 30553.5 36489.0 55372.0 87475 
2013 47524.9 19947.08 23151 33414.0 39261.0 60414.5 94648 
2014 50876.9 21153.27 26433 35099.0 41241.0 64336.5 99995 
Note: The number of observations is 24 for each year. 
Another interesting issue is found in a review of the financial development indicators. 
The heterogeneity across space was observed. In Table 2.6, for example, the ratio of the financial 
intermediation to provincial GDP in 1998 was 0.051, averaged over all of the provinces in the 
sample. The ratio spreads from 0.041 for the financially least developed provinces to 0.157 for 
the most developed province in 2014, compared to 0.007 to 0.129 in 1998 . In addition, the ratios 
of all of the provinces in Central China were under 0.070 in 2014 with a standard deviation of 
0.010, but the average ratio for provinces in Eastern China was 0.080 in 2014, greater than all 
provinces in Central China. The ratios of all provinces in Eastern China increased to 0.157 over 
the sample period. Table 2.7 tells us that the standard deviation of D_GDP in the Eastern region 
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was 1.005 in 2014, while it was 0.370 and 0.196 in the Central and Western regions, 
respectively. Similarly, in Table 2.8, the ratio of loan to provincial GDP in 1998 had a mean of 
0.994 with a standard deviation of 0.250 while the average ratio of loan to provincial GDP in 
2014 was 1.266 with a standard deviation of 0.349 across provinces. This geographical variation 
in level of financial development indicates the necessity to conduct a meaningful statistical 
analysis.  
Table 2.6: Details of F_GDP 





Eastern 1998 0.055 0.043 0.007 0.036 0.036 0.048 0.129 9 
2014 0.080 0.041 0.046 0.056 0.066 0.073 0.157 9 
Central 1998 0.040 0.018 0.024 0.026 0.036 0.058 0.070 7 
2014 0.050 0.010 0.041 0.043 0.047 0.050 0.070 7 
Western 1998 0.056 0.025 0.026 0.038 0.047 0.083 0.087 8 
2014 0.066 0.014 0.053 0.054 0.061 0.080 0.086 8 
Overall 1998 0.051 0.031 0.007 0.032 0.043 0.064 0.129 24 
2014 0.067 0.029 0.041 0.051 0.057 0.071 0.157 24 
 
Table 2.7: Details of D_GDP 





Eastern 1998 1.299 0.656 0.709 0.917 1.042 1.554 2.804 9 
2014 1.979 1.005 1.278 1.469 1.489 1.920 4.375 9 
Central 1998 0.897 0.194 0.714 0.737 0.866 0.978 1.279 7 
2014 1.381 0.370 0.913 1.184 1.261 1.510 2.098 7 
Western 1998 1.086 0.195 0.815 0.945 1.078 1.221 1.381 8 
2014 1.741 0.196 1.529 1.578 1.683 1.917 2.042 8 
Overall 1998 1.111 0.446 0.709 0.840 0.959 1.221 2.804 24 
2014 1.723 0.678 0.913 1.369 1.531 1.894 4.375 24 
 
Table 2.8: Details of L_GDP 





Eastern 1998 0.935 0.282 0.615 0.706 0.793 1.144 1.315 9 
2014 1.358 0.398 0.951 1.114 1.181 1.707 2.131 9 
Central 1998 0.894 0.179 0.560 0.767 0.932 1.029 1.071 7 
2014 0.973 0.186 0.779 0.841 0.877 1.091 1.288 7 
Western 1998 1.149 0.212 0.848 0.934 1.228 1.316 1.385 8 
2014 1.418 0.258 1.065 1.223 1.369 1.642 1.811 8 
Overall 1998 0.994 0.250 0.560 0.782 0.934 1.228 1.385 24 
2014 1.266 0.349 0.779 1.045 1.184 1.512 2.131 24 
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 Figure 2.A (Appendix) presents scatterplots of income inequality against financial 
development indicators across the Chinese provinces. Specifically, Figure 2.A.1 displays 
scatterplots with all observations across the country from 1998 to 2014, while Figure 2.A.2 
shows scatterplots based on the Eastern, Central, and Western regions. In Figure 2.A.1, each 
scatterplot illustrates changes in the Gini coefficients against each of the indicators for financial 
development with all observations in the sample. Each scatterplot clearly illustrates that the Gini 
coefficients are negatively associated with F_GDP, D_GDP, and L_GDP, while their slopes 
slightly differ. In addition, the scatterplots based on regional level (Figure 2.A.2) display a 
negative association between income disparity and the financial development measures, while 
individual provincial scatterplots reveal that, aside from Hebei in Eastern China, income 
inequalities of each province are positively associated with one or more indicators of financial 
development (Figure 2.A.3). In Central China, all provinces except Jiangxi have a positive 
association between income inequality and financial development with steeper slopes than those 
in Eastern China (Figure 2.A.1). The regional scatterplot in Figure 2.A.2 shows a positive 
association between the Gini coefficients and the ratio of financial intermediation to provincial 
GDP across Central China. In every province in Western China, the Gini coefficients are 
positively correlated with at least one indicator of financial development (Figure 2.A.1). In 
addition, income disparities in Western China are positively related with financial development, 
while the change in income inequalities against the change in the ratio of loan to provincial GDP 
has the highest slope among the indicators of financial development (Figure 2.A.2).   
 
2.3.2 Financial Development Over Time in China 
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 While China’s economic reforms have been successful in moving to a socialist market 
economy and spurring impressive growth rates, China’s financial system is less efficient as four 
major state-owned banks have more than 60% of the total financial assets in the Chinese 
economy. As an initial effort for financial reform, the People’s Bank of China separated from the 
Ministry of Finance in 1978. In the following year, China re-established the Bank of China, the 
People’s Construction Bank of China, and the Agricultural Bank of China to create free 
competition and market forces in their lending services and savers. In 1983, the Chinese 
government designated the People’s Bank of China as a central bank and set up the Commercial 
Bank to allow for more convenient financial service. Three national banks (Everbright, Hua Xia, 
and Min Sheng), many regional banks, and different non-bank financial service suppliers, which 
increased the accessibility to financial assets, were established at the end of the 1980s. China has 
significantly changed the lending policy for state own enterprises (SOE) so that the ratio of 
SOE’s dependency on direct government transfers reduced to 2% in the early 1990s, while the 
ratio of bank finance not provided by government transfers rose to 32% between 1980 and 1987.  
 The second major transition in the financial sector took place between 1994 and 2000. In 
1994, China established three policy banks, initiated indirect monetary control, and enacted the 
Commercial of Bank of China to operate commercial banks efficiently. In 1998, China 
terminated credit planning, which was set up for commercial banks owned by the state. 
Remarkably, China allowed the first private-owned bank (China Minsheng Bank) and 13 joint-
stock commercial banks to enter the Chinese banking sector by early 2000.  
 In the history of financial development in China, entry into the WTO in December 2001 
brought the greatest changes to China’s financial system. Joining the WTO forced China to take 
more aggressive policies in interest rate liberalization, deregulation on foreign banks and 
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investors, and the easing of property rights to attract more foreign banks. In 2003, the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was founded to regulate the banking sector and 
further promote asset quality, risk control, and capital adequacy. Notably, according to Wang 
and Zhang (2009), since the CBRC encouraged foreign banks to enter the Chinese domestic 
banking sector and forced all new commercial banks to have at least one foreign investor, a total 
of 223 foreign banks from 42 countries entered the domestic banking sector by 2006. 
 
2.4 Model 
 Before setting up the empirical model, a statistical hypothesis test is needed to determine 
whether each of the financial development measures in the empirical model is useful in 
forecasting the Gini coefficient or whether the Gini coefficient has an impact on financial 
development rather than the other way around. For this reason, the Granger Causality Test was 
applied, and its results are shown in Table 2.9. I reject the null that the ratio of financial 
intermediation to provincial GDP does not granger cause the Gini coefficient while failing to 
reject the null that the Gini coefficient does not granger cause the ratio of financial 
intermediation to provincial GDP, suggesting unidirectional causality from the ratio of financial 
intermediation to provincial GDP to the Gini coefficient. In addition, I reject the null that the 
ratio of total deposit to provincial GDP does not granger cause the Gini coefficient, while failing 
to reject the null that the Gini coefficient does not granger cause the ratio of total deposit to 
provincial GDP, indicating unidirectional causality from the ratio of total deposit to provincial 
GDP to the Gini coefficient. This means that financial development measured by these two ratios 
causes the changes in income disparities measured by the Gini coefficient. Therefore, for these 
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two financial development measures, unidirectional causality from financial development 
measures to the Gini coefficients is captured using the Granger Causality Test.  
 For the ratio of total loan to provincial GDP, however, I fail to reject both null hypotheses 
that the ratio of total loan to provincial GDP does not granger cause the Gini coefficients. Wei 
(2016)	argued that banks in China intentionally hide more than $2 trillion in loans, reporting that 
Chinese banks keep the loan spigot open to stimulate Chinese economy growth, which has begun 
to slow down gradually since 2010. Loans are repackaged as “investment receivables” so that a 
surge in the loans could be included as “investment receivables” in banks’ balance sheets. 
According to this argument, I assume that the collected loan data could be possibly less credible 
and, therefore, the ratio of total loan to provincial GDP does not granger cause the Gini 
coefficients even though it is frequently used to measure financial development.    
Table. 2.9: Granger Causality Test 
Null Hypothesis F-statistic 
f_gdp does not granger cause Gini 2.27* 
Gini does not granger cause f_gdp 0.28 
d_gdp does not granger cause Gini 4.22*** 
Gini does not granger cause d_gdp 1.93 
l_gdp does not granger cause Gini 1.70 
Gini does not granger cause l_gdp 0.79 
         Note: Data span for Granger Causality Test: 1995-2014 
         ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively    
 Having established the direction of causality, I now turn to the main research question, 
which is how income disparities are related to financial development after controlling for GDP 
per capita, the degree of openness, and educational attainment. To solve this main empirical 
question, the following estimation equation is needed.  
                                                (4) giniit = β1Fit
' + β2Xit
' + ui + eit
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Here, Giniit is the Gini coefficient in province i and year t. Gini is a general measure of statistical 
dispersion showing income distribution and is the most frequently used measure of income 
inequality. Fit , which is the focus of my analysis, is one of the following financial development 
indicators: 1) the ratio of the value added in financial intermediation to provincial GDP or the 
ratio of financial intermediation to provincial GDP (f_gdp), where the value-added of financial 
intermediation is the final result that is calculated at market prices and produced in a province 
during a given period by all residents engaged in finance9; 2) the ratio of total deposit of the 
financial institution to provincial GDP (d_gdp); and 3) the ratio of loans extended by financial 
intermediation to provincial GDP (l_gdp). The vector Xit contains the set of control variables: 1) 
the logarithm of provincial GDP per capita (lgdp_ca), which controls for a Kuznets effect of 
economic development on income disparities; 2) the degree of provincial economic openness to 
foreign countries (open) as measured by the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to provincial 
GDP; and 3) educational attainment (edu), the share of the population with more than secondary 
schooling as a proxy for education development. Additionally, this empirical model includes ui , 
which is a provincial random effect and eit, which is an error term. In equation (4), β1  and β2  are 
parameters. The effect of financial development on income inequality is captured by the 
parameter β1 , whereas the overall level of income disparity is captured by all of the variables on 
the right hand side of equation (4). When estimating the empirical model (4), it turns out that the 
assumptions of standard fixed effects model are violated and that residuals are serially correlated 
even if the variables in the model are first-differenced. To resolve this statistical issue, the lagged 
dependent variable is included in the empirical model (4): 
                (5) 
																																																								
9 Chinese Statistical Year Books 
giniit = β0giniit−1 + β1Fit
' + β2Xit
' + ui + eit
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 The GMM is the most commonly used technique when there is endogeneity among the 
lagged dependent variables in panel data models. The explanatory variables on the right-hand 
side of the equations may be associated with the error term or with the province specific error 
component. Furthermore, the model has the lagged dependent variables on the right-hand side of 
the equations, inserting to autocorrelation. Lastly, a possible problem is the short time period (18 
years) in the dataset. Therefore, the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimators will be biased and 
inconsistent. Arellano and Bond (1991) mentioned that if the errors are serially correlated, an 
estimator that uses lagged instruments under the assumption of white noise errors loses its 
consistency. They applied these methods to estimate employment equations using an unbalanced 
panel of 140 listed U.K. companies for the period from 1979 to 1984. The estimator also had 
significant efficiency gains compared to simpler instrument variable (IV) estimator and produced 
well determined estimates in dynamic panel data models. As suggested by Holtz et al. (1988) and 
Arellano and Bond (1991), the first difference GMM estimator is frequently utilized to deal with 
the endogeneity in panel data to eliminate individual fixed effects from the equation.  
 However, Bond et al. (2001) pointed out that the first-differenced GMM estimators tend 
to behave poorly -- exhibiting seriously bias due to the weakness of the instruments for the first-
differences -- when the number of time series is moderately small and the time series are 
persistent. This bias can decrease if the time span is large enough (Nickell, 1981), but the data in 
this study is only18 years. Thus, I turn to the so called system GMM estimation approach. In 
order to improve the properties of the standard first-differenced GMM estimator, the system 
GMM estimator is developed when the lagged levels of the explanatory variables are poor 
instruments for the first-differenced explanatory variables on the right hand side of the equation. 
To improve efficiency, the system GMM estimator utilizes the level equation in addition to the 
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differenced equation, and the variables in levels in the second equation are instrumented with 
lagged first-differences of the endogenous variables (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and 
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). Specifically, in the case where the number of time series 
(N) is small and time period (T) is long, the first differenced GMM  estimators are not 
appropriate (Roodman, 2007). To deal with this issue, Blundell and Bond (1998) added an extra 
restriction on the initial conditions process to improve the precision of the first-differenced 
GMM estimator for dynamic panel data models. By means of Monte Carlo simulations, they 
showed that the system GMM estimator yields greater precision relative to the standard first-
differenced GMM estimator when the autoregressive parameter is high and the number of time 
series is small.   
 
2.5 Empirical Results 
 Table 2.10 presents the empirical results based on equation (5) with Chinese provincial 
data from 1998 to 2014 to investigate how income inequalities are associated with financial 
development. Columns (1), (2), and (3) in Table 2.10 indicate the results from OLS without 
controlling for the endogeneity of the financial development measures. In OLS estimations, none 
of financial development measurements are significant. In system GMM estimations, however, 
there are strong relations between financial development and income inequality, with increases 
in two financial development indicators (f_gdp and l_gdp) being significantly associated with 
increases in Gini coefficients. First, the coefficient on the ratio of financial intermediation to 
provincial GDP is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in column (4) of Table 
2.10, suggesting that a 1 unit increase in the ratio of financial intermediation to provincial GDP 
increases the Gini coefficient by 14.90. Column (5) shows that the coefficient on the deposit to 
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provincial GDP is positive but not significant. Lastly, the ratio of loan to GDP is positively 
associated with income inequality at the 1% significance level, suggesting that an increase in 
loan to provincial GDP by 1 unit is associated with an increase in the Gini coefficient by 1.18. 
 As for the control variables, income inequalities are thought to be causally tied to 
provincial GDP per capita. The coefficients on the provincial GDP per capita are positively 
significant in the GMM model, while those are insignificant in pooled OLS. The coefficients on 
the degree of openness are negative and statistically significant at the 1% significance level, for 
the columns (4) and (6) in the GMM estimation. The coefficients on education attainment are 
negatively significant, which conforms to general expectation that higher education attainment 
leads to a reduction in inequality.  
Table 2.10: Financial Development and Income Inequality Based on Equation (5): 
(Dependent variable: Gini Coefficient) 
Variables Pooled OLS GMM 
Financial 
variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
      
F_gdp 5.61 
(1.28) 
  14.90** 
(2.55) 
  
D_gdp  0.08 
(0.37) 
  0.32 
(1.01) 
 
L_gdp   0.30 
(1.16) 




      




























































Adj. R2 0.884 0.883 0.883    
Arellano-
Bond test (2) 
   2.11 2.15 2.01 
Sargan test 
(P-value) 






# of Obs. 384 384 384 384 384 384 
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Note: ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics for pooled OLS and z-statistics for GMM. Arellano-Bond Test (for AR (2)) is for autocorrelation with 
a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. Sargan test’s null hypothesis is that over-identifying restrictions are valid. 
 
 Next, a dummy variable for WTO membership, equal to 1 only in a given year, is added 
into equation (5) to investigate how entry into the WTO affected the income inequality in China. 
In other words, it allows us to examine whether becoming a WTO member has a short-term 
shock to the economic system. The GMM estimators in Table 2.11 indicate that the ratios of 
financial intermediation to GDP and loan to GDP are positively significant at the 1% 
significance level, suggesting that income inequality measured by Gini coefficients turns out to 
have increased over the sample period with a more developed financial system. More 
interestingly, the size of the estimated slopes on the indicators of financial development 
increased slightly from 14.90 to 15.21 for f_gdp and from 1.18 to1.19 for l_gdp. The estimated 
slopes on the WTO membership dummy, however, are not statistically significant.  
 As for the control variables, the impacts of the degree of openness toward a world 
economy do not differ much from previous results in Table 2.10. Similarly, Table 2.11 shows 
that the size of the coefficients on degree of openness increased slightly. The size of the 
estimated slopes on the degree of openness increased from -2.13 to -2.16 in column (1) and from 
-2.61 to -2.63 in column (3). In addition, GDP per capita is positively associated with income 
inequality for all columns in Table 2.11. Lastly, educational attainment has a negative and 
significant effect on income inequality in column (1), suggesting an increase in educational 
attainment by 1 unit is related to a decrease in the Gini coefficient by 7.01.  
 Alternatively, another type of WTO membership dummy, which equals to 1 if the year is 
greater than 2001, is created to analyze whether being a WTO member has a long-term shock to 
Chinese economy. The size of the estimated slopes on financial indicators slightly increased 
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from 15.21 (column 1) to 17.14 (column 4) and from 1.19 (column 1) to 1.20 (column 4). 
Overall, the impacts of the control variables from being a WTO member do not differ much from 
becoming a member. The estimated slopes on the WTO membership dummy, however, are still 
not statistically significant. 
Table 2.11: Financial Development and Income Inequality Based on Equation (5): 
With WTO membership dummy (Dependent variable: Gini coefficient) 
 1 if year = 2001 1 if year > 2001 
Financial var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
      
F_gdp 15.21*** 
(2.59) 
  17.14*** 
(2.74) 
  
D_gdp  0.33 
(1.02) 
  0.32 
(1.00) 
 
L_gdp   1.19*** 
(3.35) 
  1.20*** 
(3.36) 
Control var.       











































































Bond test (2) 















# of Obs. 384 384 384 384 384 384 
Note: ***, **, and * indicates significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are 
z-statistics. 
 
 To check the robustness of the empirical results, alternative specifications were 
examined. First, a regional dummy was employed as an additional explanatory variable because 
Eastern provinces received greater attention of Chinese economic development policies and of 
foreign investors, while Western and Central provinces fell behind in their development. The 
Eastern provinces grew quickly, while the Central and Western provinces lagged behind. Lee 
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(2000) discussed that the sources of Chinese inequality have changed from within provinces to 
between provinces. Therefore, I re-estimated equation (5), adding a regional dummy for Eastern 
provinces to assess this particular omitted variable bias, which may cause a spurious relationship 
between financial variables and the Gini coefficient. Table 2.12 reports the empirical results 
including a regional dummy for Eastern provinces (1= Eastern, 0 otherwise). Looking at the 
impact of the region dummy, all columns indicate region dummies for Eastern provinces are 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level, suggesting average Gini coefficients in 
Eastern provinces are 2.42 point to 3.25 point less than Central and Western provinces. Financial 
development (loan to provincial GDP) also affected income inequality over the sample period. 
After adding a regional dummy for Eastern provinces, the coefficient of the ratio of loan to 
provincial GDP is still positive and statistically significant at the 10% significance level. Overall 
directions and sizes of coefficients on financial development measurement are not much different 
from the initial estimation results in Table 2.10. 
Table 2.12: Robustness check 1: Regional dummy  
(Dependent variable: Gini coefficient) 
Variables Region dummy: 1 = Eastern, 0 Otherwise 




D_gdp  -0.16 
(-0.50) 
 
L_gdp   0.72* 
(1.95) 
Control variables    







































Arellano-Bond test for AR (2) 2.11 2.11 2.03 






# of Obs. 384 384 384 
Note: ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are z-statistics. 
 
 Second, I dropped the educational attainment variable from the vector of control 
variables. Generally, educational attainment is known as a function of economic growth rate 
(Sardadvar, 2012). In other words, the empirical models for financial development and economic 
growth include educational attainment as an explanatory variable on the right-hand side of the 
equation and the Gini coefficient as a dependent variable. Thus, the reduced form of equation (5) 
excluding educational attainment allows us to take away colinearity. Table 2.13 shows the 
empirical results from the reduced form of equation (5) and reveals that financial development 
still has a significant positive effect on income inequality, suggesting an increase in the ratio of 
financial intermediation to provincial GDP by 1 point is associated with an increase in inequality 
by about 16.09 and a 1point increase in the loan to provincial GDP ratio leads to a 1.17 increase 
in inequality.  
Table 2.13: Robustness check 2: Excluding educational attainment  
(Dependent variable: Gini coefficient) 




D_gdp  0.12 
(0.37) 
 
L_gdp   1.17*** 
(3.28) 
Control variables    
























Sargan test 387.06 385.81 379.19 
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(P-value) (0.17) (0.18) (0.23) 
# of Obs. 384 384 384 
Note: ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are z-statistics. 
 
 Lastly, to test the robustness of the estimation results, I exclude two municipalities of 
Beijing and Shanghai since the banking sector in these cities is impacted by fewer policy loans 
from the central bank and has a heavily diversified banking sector. In addition, the top 10 ranked 
universities in China are heavily weighted in favor of Beijing (Tsing Hua University, Peking 
University, and Renmin University) and Shanghai (Fudan University; Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University), which may affect educational attainment. More importantly, the size of Beijing and 
Shanghai is much smaller than other provinces in the dataset, which may cause less policy lag 
than other provinces when implementing local policy to reduce income disparities. Dropping 
Beijing and Shanghai, cities that are extremely biased toward financial and educational 
development, enables us to check whether there exists a case of sample heterogeneity, which 
may arise if Beijing and Shanghai behave differently. The estimation results after dropping 
Beijing and Shanghai are presented in Table 2.14. These results are largely similar to results 
when Beijing and Shanghai are included in the dataset (Table 2.10), indicating financial 
development increases income inequality. The main differences are found in column (1) and (2): 
First, the estimated slope of f_gdp is increased to 25.69; second, it turns out that the ratio of 
deposit to provincial GDP has a significant positive effect on income inequality, suggesting an 
increase in this ratio by 1 point is related to an increase in income inequality by about 0.95 point.  
 Next, I integrate Beijing and Shanghai into Hebei and Zhejiang respectively instead of 
simply dropping those two municipalities. To incorporate to the provinces, the weighted average 
values of each variable are calculated and replaced with the initial values of variables in the 
dataset based on the equation (6) of Appendix. Overall, as shown on Table 2.14, the estimation 
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results from dropping Beijing and Shanghai are not much different from integrating those 
municipalities into each province. Therefore, the estimating model excluding or including 
Beijing and Shanghai does not seem to create considerable differences.  
Table 2.14: Robustness check 3: Excluding the municipalities  
(Beijing and Shanghai) 
 Dropping Beijing and Shanghai Integrating Beijing to Hebei and  
Shanghai to Zhejiang 
Financial var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
      
F_gdp 25.69*** 
(4.03) 
  22.53*** 
(3.55) 
  
D_gdp  0.95*** 
(2.68) 
  0.80** 
(2.31) 
 
L_gdp   1.47*** 
(3.93) 
  1.63*** 
(4.53) 
Control var.       





























































test for AR (2) 















# of Obs. 352 352 352 352 352 352 




 Previous theoretical studies provide remarkably dynamic models to investigate the link 
between financial development and income inequity by offering theoretical consensus that the 
poor or low-income labor receive benefits from financial deepening. There is a lack of empirical 
studies that examine the theoretical financial development ─ inequality relationship, particularly 
for income disparities in China due to a lack of accessible data at the province, city, and county 
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levels, even though a surge in overall national inequality is attributed to an increase in income 
inequality within provinces, cities, or counties across the country. In this paper, based on a recent 
dataset between 1998 and 2014, I explored the long-run relationships between financial 
development and income inequality by looking at how income disparities are associated with 
financial development. First, one of main findings is that the ratio of financial intermediation to 
provincial GDP has a significant positive impact on income inequality, and it is robust across all 
specifications. Second, the empirical model with the year dummy for 2001 to explore the effect 
of entry into the WTO reports that the positive impacts of financial development on income 
inequality increased, indicating entry into the WTO accelerated financial development in China. 
Lastly, the specification with the region dummy for Eastern provinces reveals that these 
provinces, which received greater attention of Chinese economic development policies and of 
foreign investors, are more equal than other provinces. As for educational attainment, initially, 
its effect on inequality is negatively significant as expected. After dropping Beijing and 
Shanghai, however, educational attainment is no more significant. However, it differs from the 
general thought that increasing educational attainment leads to a reduction in income inequality. 
This disjunction can be explained by educational inflation or devaluation of educational 
attainment in Chinese education, where the number of people who graduated from Chinese 
higher education increased from 1 million per year in 2000 to 7 million per year in 2010, and 
total enrollment of students in higher educational institutions increased to 15 million, with rapid 
growth that was expected to peak in 2008 (Caron, 2012; Porter, 2005). According to Robbins 
(2016), the Chinese government evaluated national universities in 1994, and through Project 
98510 and the Thousand Talents Program11, they reformed the higher education system with an 
																																																								
10 In this project, local and national governments allocate large amounts of financial aid toward selected universities, 
China Education Center.  
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emphasis on elite universities. Consequentially, the Chinese government adopted an advanced 
education system in some of the elite institutions, such as Peking University and Tsinghua 
University, for selected students. As discussed, education reform was extremely radical to foster 
some of the selected elite universities, which reveals why educational attainment is losing its 
impact on reducing income inequality. 
This study has the following policy implication. Financial development policy subsidized 
by local or provincial government spending such as a low-interest loan, micro finance, or 
subsidized education loans, will enhance the number of lending activities of low-income people 
and therefore lead a reduction in income disparities. While financial development, which is 
seriously biased toward Eastern provinces, promotes economic growth in China, Gini 
coefficients in the provincial level have been increased even though overall Chinese Gini 
coefficient has been decreased. Along with huge economic growth driven by economic reforms 
since 1978, China has successfully decreased overall income inequality and poverty line. 
However, its central government policy such as government expenditures is biased toward 
urbanization and infrastructural construction not towards social safety net or unemployment care.  
 Easterlin et al. (2012) reported that the degree of life satisfaction among the Chinese 
decreased from 1990 to 2010. Although China has achieved enormous economic growth with an 
average annual growth rate of 10%, the achievement of hyper-growth has led to income 
inequality. An increase in interprovincial inequality may lead to socioeconomic instability, 
which can be an obstacle in China’s economic growth in the long run. For long-term economic 
growth viability, it is necessary to organize a reliable interprovincial level dataset and, 
furthermore, a city or county level dataset to reveal the determinants of interprovincial income 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
11 This is a talent recruitment program conducted by the Chinese government in 2008 to recruit talented professors 
and researchers for universities and institutions in China.	
	 69	
inequality with polygonal angles. This will enable us to reveal fundamental causes of income 
inequality in China, to explore the dynamics of income disparities, and to examine newly 
contributing factors. 
 
2.A Appendix                                                                                                                   
Table 2.A.1: Panel Data Model Estimations between1998 and 2014 
(Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient) 
 Random Effect GLS without gini (-1) Random Effect GLS with gini (-1) 
F_gdp -29.30*** 
(-3.09) 
  5.61 
(1.28) 
  
D_gdp  0.72 
(1.28) 
 
  0.08 
(0.37) 
 
L_gdp   0.99 
(1.62) 
  0.30 
(1.16) 






















































Obs. 408 408 408 384 384 384 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are z-statistics.  
 
Table 2.A.2: Panel Data Model Estimations between 1998 and 2014 
(Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient) 
 Fixed Effect without gini (-1) Fixed Effect with gini (-1) 
F_gdp -33.77*** 
(-3.64) 
  4.09 
(0.55) 
  
D_gdp  0.15 
(0.24) 
  -0.16 
(-0.35) 
 
L_gdp   -0.15 
(-0.23) 
  0.43 
(0.93) 























































Obs. 408 408 408 384 384 384 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics.  
 
Table 2.A.3: Panel Data Model Estimations between 1998 and 2014 
(Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient) 
 Random MLE without gini (-1) Random MLE with gini (-1) 
F_gdp -33.06*** 
(-3.65) 
  5.61 
(1.29) 
  
D_gdp  0.26 
(0.44) 
  0.08 
(0.38) 
 
L_gdp   0.12 
(4.00) 
  0.30 
(1.17) 






















































Obs. 408 408 408 384 384 384 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are z-statistics.  
 
Equation (6): Integrating Beijing to province Hebei and Shanghai to province Zhejiang   




















































Figure 2.A.1: The Scatterplots with all observations across a country 
(Y-axis: Gini, X-axis: Each of the measures of financial development) 
a. Gini vs. The ratio of deposit to provincial GDP 
 
b. Gini vs. The share of financial sector in provincial GDP 
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c. Gini vs. The ratio of loan to provincial GDP 
 
Figure 2.A.2: The Scatterplot for Eastern, Central, and Western China  
(Y-axis: Gini, X-axis: Each of the measures of financial development) 
1. Eastern China 
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c. Western China 
 
 
Figure 2.A.3: The Scatterplots for each different province and municipalities 
(Y-axis: Gini, X-axis: Each of the measures of financial development) 
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3. Financial Development and Income Inequality in China - A Spatial Data Analysis 
with Dr. Chu-Ping C. Vijverberg 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 China has one of the world’s highest levels of income inequality, followed only by South 
Africa and Brazil at 0.63 and 0.53, respectively. In the last decade, China’s Gini coefficient 
fluctuated between 0.45 and 5.012 (Figure 1), past the warning level to cause social instability or 
unhealthy economic development. As is well known, Deng Xiaoping initiated a major policy and 
piloted major economic reforms in the late 1970s. One of Deng’s most famous sayings is, “It 
does not matter whether a cat is white or black, as long as it catches mice,” The underlying 
implication was that both socialism and capitalism are acceptable as long as the people/ society 
benefits from them. For these reasons of equality and bettering people’s lives, China opened up 
and started expanding economically and socially. After a few decades of high economic growth, 
China passed Japan in 2010 to become the second largest economy in the world.  Accompanying 
this accelerated growth, however, China paid a price in having its income inequality index 
ranked as one of the highest in the world, even though economic growth reduced the number of 
people under the absolute poverty line. Due to this uneasy rising income inequality and the 
concern of its possible negative impact on economic growth, the top priority of China’s twelfth 
Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) was to decrease inequality and balance economic development (Fan, 
1997; Xinhuanet, 2006).  In the increasing concerns on inequality, numerous recent papers 
investigate the causes of income inequality.  Related research focuses on the following channels 
as determinants of inequality: 1) central and local governments’ favorable policies towards 
																																																								
12 The World Bank considers societies having a Gini coefficient of more than 0.40 are at an increased risk of 
widespread social unrest. 
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Eastern provinces (Fu, 2004; Kennedy, 2014); 2) human capital accumulation (Cai, Wang and 
Du, 2002); 3) foreign direct investment (Wei, Yao, and Liu, 2007); 4) trade openness (Rivas, 
2007); 5) decentralization (West and Wong, 1995; Tselios et al., 2012); 6) the multi-mechanism 
of socioeconomic, environmental, locational, policy and geographic information system (GIS) 
data (Li and Fang, 2014).  
Figure 3.1: Recent Trend in China’s Gini coefficient 
 
China’s income inequality has various facets: urban versus rural, coastal versus inland, 
within-urban versus within-rural, etc. Most researchers believe that these rising income 
disparities have been caused by various institutional and policy factors before and during 
economic reforms (Kanbur and Zhang, 2005; Cheng, 2007). In the early years, heavy industry-
oriented development strategy, together with the urban-biased monetary and fiscal policies, 
generated a sizable income gap between urban and rural areas. Later, due to openness to 
international markets, regional development policy, e.g., coastal-biased policy such as providing 













2005), widened income disparity between coastal and inland provinces. Next and most 
importantly, the household registration system (i.e., hukou), where migrant workers have 
extreme difficulties changing their officially registered rural residence to urban residence, 
fortified the persistent wage gap between urban and rural workers. With the first two 
contributing factors being dissolved and “hukou” in the process of being abolished or reformed, 
China is moving toward the direction of inequality reduction. However, due to many dimensions 
of a huge economy such as China’s, it is unrealistic to consider that the labor market issue is the 
only culprit of income inequality in China. More research is needed to understand the dynamics 
of income equality, to examine new contributing factors, and to identify ways to reduce income 
inequality. 
One of dominant motives of income inequality is the effect of financial development (Li, 
Squire, & Zou, 1998; Clarke et al., 2003; Beck et al., 2004; Liang, 2006; Wang, 2012; Jauch & 
Watzka, 2016). In addition to numerous empirical works on the effect of financial development, 
the theoretical connection between financial development and income inequality was mentioned 
in Kuznets’s urban possibilities argument (Kuznets, 1955). As the economy develops and society 
becomes more urbanized, formerly poor migrants get to choose their education level and 
business activities as credits become more accessible in a well-developed financial system. This 
decreases income inequality. Theoretical papers connecting income inequality and financial 
development predict either a liner or a non-linear relationship. A liner relationship implies that a 
well-developed financial system reduces income inequality (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor 
and Zeira, 1993) while a non-linear relationship indicates an inverted U-shaped curve – at the 
early stage of financial development, due to limited access of credits to a few privileged groups, 
income inequality rises, but after a certain stage, financial development reduces income 
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inequality (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). Thus, while most believe that financial 
development decreases income inequality for a mature and advanced economy, financial 
development, depending on the stage of economic development, may increase or decrease 
income inequality for developing countries. Empirical results of both cross-country and single 
country analyses are mixed for both developed and developing countries (Li, Squire, and Zou, 
1998; Clarke et al., 2003; Beck et al., 2004; Liang, 2006; Wang, 2012; Jauch and Watzka, 2016).  
Since the early 1980s, China’s banking system has been reformed. The four state-owned 
specialized banks, known as The Big Four, began to accept deposits and engaged in banking 
activities in the 1980s. Even as the Big Four, which dominated more than 60% of the total 
financial assets in the Chinese economy, converted to publicly-listed banks and more 
domestic/foreign banks joined the system, the Chinese government still has a dominant impact 
on banks’ activities in China. According to Bradsher (2013)13, “…banks in China have been 
encouraged by regulators to lend overwhelmingly to state-owned enterprises that appear certain 
to repay loans. That has left smaller business and private companies starved for credit.” As of 
2012, small and medium-sized private enterprises received about 3% of bank lending even 
though their economic activities accounted for at least half of the overall activities. Because 
credit accessibility is essential for the implementation of business projects and investment 
activities, income generated by these non-privileged groups is obviously affected. Furthermore, 
student loans from banks are not common in China. According to Bradsher (2013), although 
college entrance is based on the entrance examination, which evaluates students’ academic 
ability, and the central government offers grants and need-based loans for students at 4-year 
universities, it is still not straightforward for children from poor families to receive financial aid 
																																																								
13 Bradsher, K. (2013). In China, Families Bet It All on College for Their Children, The New York Times, Feb. 16, 
2013. 
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for their education. In addition, children from poor and rural families tend to perform worse than 
rich and urban children on college entrance examinations due to poor training in high school, 
particularly in the subject of foreign language such as English. Thus, rich and urban children 
tend to have an edge over children from poor and rural families to enter top universities. 
Bradsher (2013) stated, “The result that higher education is rapidly losing its role as a social 
leveler in China and as a safety valve for talented but poor youths to escape poverty.” The 
theoretical concept of decreasing income inequality in a well-developed financial system is an 
empirical subject worthy of investigation in China through the linkages of bank credit 
availability and education level.  
 Next, there is a great deal of attention on geographical location to reveal a mechanism of 
economic growth or income inequalities (Baker and Grosh, 1994; Hare and West, 1999; 
Fingleton, 1999, 2001; Li and Fang, 2014). The majority of these studies investigated 
interactions between economic growth and income inequality or between financial development 
and income inequality. Since Chinese economic reforms can be summarized by privatization, 
industrialization, and urbanization, income disparities among eastern, western, and central 
provinces have been widening as shown by real GDP per capita of eastern provinces was 2.24 
times higher in 1994. More prominently, real GDP per capita of Shanghai, a municipality in the 
east, is 10 times more than the real GDP per capita of Guizhou province in the west. Although it 
is theoretically very important to investigate the relationship between financial development, 
economic growth, and income inequality, spatial analysis on income disparities is required 
mainly because Chinese reform policy has been highly dependent on a friendly environment for 
trade, external finance, and a special economic zone in the eastern region. Since each province 
has different accessibilities from foreign countries and investments, spatial analysis plays a 
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pivotal role to reveal the dynamics of income disparities as well as economic growth. According 
to Goodchild (2000), recent attention in spatial analysis utilizes insight on spatial issues of 
income disparities and improves empirical validity. Recent discoveries facilitating spatial 
analysis such as spatial effects, spatial distribution, and the pattern of spatial association shed 
light on the association between spatial dependence, spatial heterogeneity, and regional income 
inequalities (Rey and Montouri, 1999; Le Gallo and Ertur, 2003), while literature on income 
disparities generally overlooks the use of spatial analysis.  
Since Chinese economic reforms in the 1970s, provincial growth and development are 
extremely uneven so that income inequalities within provinces and inter-provinces have surged 
substantially (Zhang and Kanbur, 2005), and regional disparities between the coast and inland 
are mainly to blame for income inequalities at the inter-provincial level (Li and Xu, 2008). This 
uneven geographical development in China during economic development indicates that an 
analysis on regional location or space may infer regionally unbalanced development or income 
disparities. For this reason, recent empirical research sheds light on the role of spatial effects in 
regional inequality in China (Ma, 2006; Hering and Poncet, 2007; De Sousa and Poncet, 2007; 
Hering and Poncet, 2010).  
Spatial analysis is acknowledged to be a powerful tool (Rey and Montouri, 1999), so 
model specification without spatial dependence may cause serious misspecification (Abreu et al., 
2005). As an initial step to this research, Gini coefficient maps in Figure 2 show the spatial 
dependence of provincial Gini coefficients, indicating that Chinese provinces are clustered in 
1998 and 2014 with similar Gini coefficients. Therefore, to investigate the relationship between 
financial development and income inequality in China, the incorporation of spatial dependence 
in the model is crucial.  
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Figure 3.2: Gini Coefficient Maps 
Gini map in 1998 Gini map in 2014 
  
 In this paper, we evaluate the impact of financial development on income inequality in 
China through spatial dependence modeling techniques. In spatial econometrics (Lesage, 1999), 
spatial dependence among sample observations is taken into account, where the values of 
observations in one group/location may depend on the values in another group/location. This 
spatial dependence is not limited to research related to geographical neighbors; it may appear in 
the format of economic neighbors, social network structures, etc. Therefore, unlike traditional 
time series models that only relate the values of observations over time, spatial dependence 
modeling techniques incorporate a peculiar relationship among the observations at a point of 
time in the modeling process. There are various ways spatial dependence may occur. In general, 
there are different channels that spatial dependence may enter a model: (a) income inequality of 
a specific province or municipality is influenced by the inequalities of its surrounding provinces 
or municipalities; (b) income inequality of a province is affected by non-observable or non-
measurable variable and that effect is captured through spatial dependence in the disturbance 
term; for example, central government’s monetary policy or a certain economic reform is non-
measureable, but it affects all provinces; (c) a mixture of (a) and (b). In the case of (a) and (c), 
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the direct and indirect measurement effects are reported.  
 Our contributions to the literature are the following. First, we use provincial data from 
1998 to 2014 to investigate the relationship between provincial financial development and 
provincial income inequality in China. As is well known, provincial data of Gini coefficients are 
not available for a few provinces and for certain years. To deal with missing data, a GMM 
regression is estimated by using available data to obtain predicted values for those missing. 
Second, an exploratory spatial analysis is implemented for 29 administrative units in China for 
the years of 1998, 2003, 2008, and 2013. The results verify spatial dependence of provincial 
income inequalities in China. Third, we use these 29 administrative units in China to fit an 
income inequality spatial model by first certifying the necessity of using a spatial model by 
implementing Moran’s test on OLS residuals. Next, the LM test is conducted to find a suitable 
spatial model. Fourth, due to limited observations in cross-sectional spatial models, we pooled 
the data and estimate spatial panel models.  The advantage of using spatial panel model is not 
limited to just observing more data points.  Due to sequential observations for 18 years, the panel 
model may capture the interactions between financial development and provincial income 
inequality and provide some dynamics in a relationship that the cross-sectional model could not 
produce.  Thus, our analysis provides a special angle to look into China’s income inequality 
issue.  
 This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous literature on spatial 
analysis of interprovincial inequality. In Section 3, we briefly present methods of spatial data 
analysis and the data. In the fourth section, applying a provincial level dataset of China over the 
period from 1998 to 2014, we calculate global and local Moran’s I, which are spatial 
autocorrelation statistics, draw the Moran scatterplot, and estimate spatial panel models. Lastly, 
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Section 5 reviews the main findings for spatial data analysis on interprovincial inequalities.   
3.2 Literature Review 
 In an effort to introduce spatial impacts into inequality analysis, Rey (2001) calculated 
the Theil index and Moran’s I statistics with U.S. state income data from 1929-2000. Although 
he found a positive relationship between these two measures in various spatial partitionings – 
Census regions, Census division, and BEA (Bureau of Economic Analysis) – and arrangements, 
policy implications are difficult to derive from this discovery.  
 Le Gallo and Ertur (2001) believed that, due to spatial interactions between regions, 
geographical location is relevant in examining regional economic performances.  They evaluated 
the relationship between the spatial dependence and the distribution of regional GDP per capita 
in Europe using 138 regions for 11 European counties between 1980 and 1995.  By observing 
global and local spatial autocorrelations, they portrayed the way economic activities are located 
in the EU.  The authors conformed a strong association between spatial dependence and the 
distribution of regional per capita GDP in Europe throughout the whole sample period between 
1980 and 1995. Additionally, by identifying clusters of high and low per capita GDP during the 
sample period, they illustrated a persistence in the geographical disparities between European 
regions. Kanbur and Zhang (2005) analyzed regional inequality in China with a long-run time 
series dataset. To capture the key economic policies during economic transition, three policy 
indicators were created: (1) an indicator of the bias against agriculture and China’s comparative 
advantage to investigate how a lack of government support in the agricultural industry and the 
surge in heavy industry led to an increase in inequality between urban and rural; (2) an indicator 
of the degree of openness to capture how policy of international economic integration, a driving 
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force of economic development in China, affects regional inequality; (3) an indicator of 
decentralization to analyze how local government’s fiscal budget controlling power granted by 
the central government during economic reform influences income disparities. The empirical 
findings suggested that heavy-industry development strategy was the most dominant cause of 
urban and rural inequality in China and that policy of international economic integration and 
fiscal decentralization resulted in the surge of inequality between inland and coastal provinces 
during the reform period of the 1980s and 1990s.  
  As for geographical studies on Chinese regional inequalities, Wei and Ye (2009) 
investigated regional inequality in Zhejiang, a province at the forefront of Chinese economic 
growth, using an extensive county-level dataset and adopting exploratory spatial data analysis 
techniques of global and local Moran’s I, Space-Time Analysis of Regional System, and 
geographically weighted regression. They found that regional inequality in Zhejiang province of 
China exhibited strong spatial autocorrelation, while the level of regional inequality in Zhejiang 
increased during the Chinese economic transition period and a partition between interior and 
coastal Zhejiang formed. Similarly, Wei, Yu, and Chen (2011) investigated regional inequality in 
Jiangsu province of China using a spatial Markov chain analysis, Moran’s I, and geographically 
weighed regression analysis. They discovered a general increasing trend of regional inequality 
and revealed a surge in regional inequality that resulted from rapid development in southern 
Jiangsu.  They also mentioned that northern Jiangsu was confronted with developmental 
difficulties due to strong geographical barriers. Findings from the spatial Markov chain analysis 
suggested that the level of development for geographically neighboring counties strongly affects 
a county’s level of development. For example, if a county with a low level of development is 
neighboring a county with a relatively high level of development, the low developmental county 
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has a relatively higher developmental level than other low developmental counties neighboring 
relatively poor counties. The empirical findings from the geographically weighted regression 
analysis revealed that a county’s developmental dynamics are strongly correlated with local 
characteristics. 
  Recently, Li and Fang (2014) investigated the multi-mechanism of regional inequality 
from 1992 to 2010 with spatial panel data models. They categorized the explanatory variables 
into socioeconomic, environmental, locational, and policy factors and constructed indicators to 
represent each of the categorized variables. The authors found that a non-stationary dynamic 
structure is captured in Chinese regional inequality. In addition, the spatial panel data analysis 
demonstrated that each socioeconomic, environmental, locational, and policy factor was 
statistically significant while their impact on regional inequality gradually disappeared. More 
significantly, they illustrated that spatial panel models are superior to OLS techniques and, 
therefore, concluded that spatial data analysis is more suitable in revealing regional inequality 
and development. Unlike Li and Fang (2014), our paper uses provincial data from 1998 to 2014 
to analyze the association between financial development provincial income disparities in China 
after missing Gini coefficients are estimated by using available provincial data. This advantage 
of panel provincial data enables us to see some dynamics in a relationship.   
3.3 Methodology and Data 
 Anselin (2005) argued that before the spatial regression model is estimated, exploratory 
spatial data analysis should be applied as a preliminary step. In order to test spatial dependence, 
the spatial autocorrelation is calculated using Moran’s I, which is a weighted correlation 
coefficient, and can be visualized using the Moran scatterplot (Anselin, 1988). Moran’s I ranges 
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between -1 and +1, where a positive I indicates positive spatial autocorrelation, which occurs 
when similar values for the random variable are clustered together in space. A zero value of 
Moran’s I presents a random spatial pattern. For example, if a value of Moran’ I is close to 1, 
there is strong and positive spatial autocorrelation. On the other hand, if a value of Moran’s I is 
close to -1, there is a strong but negative spatial autocorrelation. Moran’s I is calculated as: 
          (1) 
where wij is an element of a binary spatial weights matrix W such that wij = 1 if states i and j 
share a border and zero otherwise. yi is per capita income in province i and is the average per 
capita income for the 29 administrative units.  
  Next, the Moran scatterplot visualizes the spatial association for exploratory analysis 
(Anselin, 1996) since it presents how similar an observed province is to its geographically 
neighboring province. The horizontal X axis, which is called the response axis on the Moran 
scatterplot, indicates the values of observations, while the vertical Y axis specifies the weighted 
average of the neighboring observations on the response X axis. In the Moran scatterplot, there 
are four quadrants of the scatterplot defined by the horizontal line y=0 and the vertical line x=0, 
indicating different spatial associations, respectively. Quadrant 1 in the top right (or high-high) 
presents values with positive spatial association higher than the sample mean, while Quadrant 3 
in the bottom left (or low-low) presents values with positive spatial association lower than the 
sample mean. In the same way, Quadrant 2 in the top left (or low-high) and Quadrant 4 in the 
bottom right (or high-low) correspond to negative spatial association, meaning each observation 
exhibits dissimilarity to its geographically neighboring observations.  
 However, the global Moran test discussed above does not enable us to identify the 
I = N
wijj∑i∑
wijj∑ (yi −i∑ y )(yj − y )
(yi −i∑ y )2
y
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regional structure of spatial autocorrelation because global spatial autocorrelation analysis 
produces the test statistic with the homogeneity assumption that the same patterns occur over the 
whole geographic area, while the local Moran test assumes that different patterns or processes 
may occur in different locations of the overall area. Since the global Moran test statistic is 
calculated from the local relationships between the observed values at a spatial entity and its 
neighboring observations, Anselin (1995) suggested Local Indicators of Spatial Association 
(LISA), which breaks the global measures into two different components and construct localized 
tests to search for clusters and hotspots. The local Moran test statistic for a unit i is 
                        (2)
 
                                                              (3) 
where zi is the original variable yi in standardized form, SDy is the standard deviation of y, wij is 
the spatial weight, and the summation is referred to summing the neighboring values from each 
row i of the spatial weights matrix. A positive LISA value indicates that a feature has 
geographically neighboring features with similarly high or low attribute values (a cluster) while a 
negative LISA value implies that a feature has neighboring features with dissimilar values (an 
outlier). Also, the significance map shows those regions with different significant levels of LISA 
(Anselin, 1995).   
 The goal of this paper is to investigate spatial interactions of financial development and 
provincial income inequality in China between 1998 and 2014. A further step delves into the 
spatial determination of income inequality, where spatial models such as a spatial lag model and 
spatial error models are applied to allow for the spatial dependence of income inequality. First, 







as reviewed by Anselin (1988) and Anselin and Bera (1998), in the spatial lag model, spatial 
dependence is expressed by spatial autocorrelation, which explains how a province’s Gini 
coefficient can be influenced by the Gini coefficients in surrounding provinces. The spatial lag 
regression model can be expressed as: 
                                                  (4) 
where y is a n times 1 vector of observations, W is a n times n spatial weight matrix, X is a n by k 
matrix of k explanatory variable, β is a k times 1 vector of coefficients, ρ is the spatial lag 
dependence or spatial autoregressive coefficient that is supposed to be between -1 and +1, 
measuring how neighboring observations affect the dependent variable, and u is a n times 1 
vector of uncorrelated error terms. More exactly, its lower bond is sometimes stated to be -1 but 
this is actually quite in doubt. The model is likely unstable if it is close to -1. Rather, it should be 
greater than the smallest eigenvalue of W (i.e., the largest negative eigenvalue). The spatial 
weight matrix (W) consists of Wij, which measures the relative location of all point i and j. In this 
study, spatial neighbors are based on contiguity (or adjacency): 1) Wij is equal to 1 if provinces 
share their border; 2) Wij is equal to 0 if provinces do not share their border.  
 Second, the spatial error model is estimated by maximum likelihood with a spatial error 
term. In this case, a shock in surrounding provinces spills over through the error term.  It begins 
with equation (5) having spatial errors of equation (6).  
     (5) 
     (6) 
where u is the vector of error terms, spatially correlated by means of the weights matrix (W), 𝜆 is 
the spatial error coefficient, and e is a vector of uncorrelated error terms. By substituting 
equation (6) into (5), the spatial error model is   
y = ρW1y + Xβ + u
y = Xβ + u
u = λWu + e
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    y = Xβ + (I − λw)−1e     (7) 
Equation (7) illustrates the spatial correlation in its error term: whereas e is uncorrelated, 
(I − λW )−1e  is correlated whenever λ ≠ 0 . 
 Lastly, we consider the spatial lag and error model, which starts from 
    (8) 
      (9) 
By substituting equation (9) into (8), the spatial lag and error model is   
y = ρW1y + Xβ + (I − λW2 )
−1e    (10) 
where u is the vector of error terms, spatially weighed with the weight matrix (W2), ρ is the 
spatial lag dependence, measuring the average influence on observations by their neighboring 
observations, λ is the spatial error coefficient, and e is a vector of uncorrelated error terms.  
 In the spatial econometric literature, the three models are special cases of the SARAR (p, 
q) model where p denotes the number of spatial lags of y and q denotes the number of spatial 
lags in the error. Thus, the spatial lag model in equation (4) is a SARAR (1,0) model; equations 
(5)-(6) are the SARAR (0,1) model, and equation (8)-(9) are the SARAR (1,1) model.  
  To investigate the impact of spatial dependence and spatial scale on interprovincial 
inequalities, as shown in Table 3.1 and Figure 1, we use the definition of formal administrative 
units in China provided by the Seventh Five-Year Plan. It is frequently used for analysis on 
regional inequality in China (Fan, 1995a; Lee, 2000; Wei, 2000). The Western region includes 
nine provinces and one municipality, the Central region includes nine provinces, and the Eastern 
region includes 10 provinces and two municipalities. Since Tibet is frequently omitted from 
research on regional income disparities (Zhang, 2003; Chen, 2006), we also exclude Tibet from 
the spatial analysis in this paper. After 2006, the Central Chinese government added a new 
y = ρW1y + Xβ + u
u = λW2u + e
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region, the Northeastern region (Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning provinces) and announced the 
Four Region Division policy (Central, Eastern, Northeastern, and Western regions) in the 
Eleventh Five-Year Plan14. However, our analysis is based on the Eastern, Central, and Western 
divisions.  
Table 3.1: Administrative Regions in China 
Region Provinces and municipalities 
Eastern Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, 
Liaoning, Shandong, Tianjin, and Zhejiang and two 
municipalities Beijing and Shanghai 
Central Anhui, Henan, Heilongjiang, Hubei, Hunan, inner Mongolia, 
Jiangxi, Jilin, Shanxi 
Western Gansu, Guizhou, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Tibet, 
Xinjiang, Yunnan, Chongqing 
 
Figure 3.3: Provincial Level Units in China 
																																																								
14 The Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China 
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Source: Seventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China 
 The provincial GDP and Gini coefficient for spatial analysis are from a cross-sectional 
dataset of 29 Chinese provinces and municipalities over the period between 1998 and 2014 
provided by the Chinese Statistical Yearbook of each province and the Almanac of China’s 
Finance and Banking published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. For this paper, 
Gini coefficients are used to account for provincial inequalities mainly because only Gini 
coefficients are promptly reported by China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The Gini 
coefficient is presented as:  
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    (11) 
where xi is the wealth or income of person i, and n is the number of people.  
 To deal with the missing Gini values, we use the following X matrix for prediction (y 
variables are Gini coefficients in neighboring provinces). 
X = (lgdp_ca, open, edu, f_gdp)                                          (12) 
The vector X contains the set of control variables: (1) the logarithm of provincial GDP per capita 
(lgdp_ca); (2) the degree of provincial economic opening to foreign countries (open) as 
measured by the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to provincial GDP; (3) educational 
attainment (edu), the share of the population with more than secondary schooling as a proxy for 
education development; (4) the ratio of the value-added of financial intermediation to provincial 
GDP (f_gdp), where the value-added of financial intermediation is the final result of market-
priced value-added of the products produced by all residents engaged in finance15. 
 Previous papers utilized global Moran’s I, local Moran’s I, and Moran scatterplots to 
investigate spatial dependence of income inequality or economic growth.  Researchers have 
rarely used spatial models to analyze China’s provincial income inequality.  One of the primary 
reasons is missing Gini in some provinces and municipalities, i.e., Hunan, Jilin, Shandong, 
Tianjin, and Yunnan16. For the spatial model analysis, the weight matrix is an essential element 
of the model.  However, if several provinces have missing values, the spatial model cannot 
provide an adequate analysis through the weight matrix. Thus, to overcome missing data for a 
																																																								
15 Chinese Statistical Year Book 
16 These provinces (or municipalities) did not provide data of low income, medium-low income, medium income, 
medium-high income, and high income so that Gini coefficients were not calculated.  
G = i=1
n












specific province or municipality,17 we estimate a GMM regression model for its neighboring 
provinces using observed Gini data to obtain the predicted Gini for the provinces (or 
municipalities) with the missing Gini.18   
giniit = β1giniit−1 + β2Fit
' + β3Xit
' + µi + λt + ε it    (13) 
where Gini is each provincial Gini coefficient, µi  is a provincial random effect, λt  is a time 
fixed effect, and ε it  is an error term. 
 One issue in using equation (13) to obtain the predicted Gini coefficients for missing 
values is the missing provincial random effect. In the case of Hunan, for example, to construct a 
better prediction, the average of the values of ε it in neighboring provinces (i.e., Chongqing, 
Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Hubei, and Jiangxi) is computed and then added to the estimated 
Gini coefficients of Hunan. All other missing Gini coefficients are calculated in the same way.  
3.4 Empirical results  
 We do an Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis and estimate a spatial econometrics model to 
investigate the spatial relationship between financial development and income inequality.  Since 
we use the estimated Gini coefficients from the GMM model above, the data sample for this 
spatial analysis includes 29 administrative units (i.e., 21 provinces, 4 municipalities, and 4 
autonomous regions) in China over the period between 1998 and 2014. To illustrate the overall 
spatial trend over this, we choose 1998, 2003, 2008, and 2013 ─ the beginning and the end of the 
data sample and those five years apart ─ as representative cases. 
																																																								
17  Another option is to use observed Ginis for provinces in Western, Central and Eastern regions and obtain the 
predicted Gini for the provinces with missing Ginis from the corresponding regional equations, respectively.   
18 The provinces sharing borders with Hunan (Chongqing, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Hubei, and Jiangxi), Jilin 
(Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Liaoning), Shandong (Anhui, Hebei, Henan, and Jiangsu), Tianjin (Beijing and 
Hebei), and Yunnan (Guangxi, Guizhou, and Sichuan), respectively. 
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3.4.1 Global Moran Statistics 
 Table 3.2 reports the Moran’s I statistics for Gini coefficient between 1998 and 2014 for 
the 29 Chinese administrative units, indicating a global significant trend to spatial 
autocorrelation. For all sample years, the null hypothesis of spatial randomization is rejected 
because Moran’s I statistics is significant at the 1% significance level. This tells us that provinces 
having relatively large Gini coefficient are close to other provinces having relatively large Gini 
coefficients and provinces with low Gini coefficients are close to provinces with low Gini 
coefficients. Another finding is that Moran’s I statistics increased from 0.456 to 0.629 between 
1998 and 2001 and thereafter (after WTO entry) decreased to 0.315, indicating that, over the 
years, spatial dependence increases and then decreases.   
Table 3.2: Moran’ I Statistics for Gini coefficient 
Year Moran’ I Standard Deviation 
1998 0.456*** 0.136 
1999 0.626*** 0.134 
2000 0.618*** 0.134 
2001 0.667*** 0.134 
2002 0.629*** 0.134 
2003 0.626*** 0.134 
2004 0.517*** 0.138 
2005 0.584*** 0.134 
2006 0.584*** 0.134 
2007 0.596*** 0.135 
2008 0.526*** 0.135 
2009 0.511*** 0.133 
2010 0.474*** 0.133 
2011 0.374*** 0.137 
2012 0.342*** 0.136 
2013 0.309*** 0.137 
2014 0.315*** 0.136 
Note: ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
3.4.2 Local Indicator of Spatial Autocorrelation (LISA) 
 LISA is used to identify patterns of significant spatial clustering of similar or dissimilar 
values among the provinces. As presented in Table 3.3, in 1998, most Western provinces (Gansu, 
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Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, and Xinjiang) have a significant positive value of local Moran’s I, 
which suggests there is a “cluster” of high values of Gini analyzed with reference to the average 
of all provinces in that year. Second, some Eastern provinces or municipalities such as Beijing, 
Jiangsu, Shanghai, and Tianjin, which were the most urbanized municipalities and provinces in 
China in 1998, have a significant positive value of local Moran’s I, pointing to a tendency 
towards clustering of high values, while Central provinces have no significant value of local 
Moran’s I. In 2013, Central provinces do not show any significant value of local Moran’s I, but 
Eastern provinces or municipalities (Beijing, Hebei, Tianjin, and Zhejiang) do, specifying a high-
value cluster. In addition, Western provinces (Gansu, Ningxia, and Qinghai) show a tendency 
towards a clustering of high values.  
Table 3.3: Local Indicators of Spatial Association: Gini coefficient 
Province or 
Municipalities 
Region 1998 2003 2008 2013 
Anhui Central -0.004 -0.118 -0.078 -0.054 
Zhejiang Eastern -0.031 0.541* 0.346 0.229* 
Jiangxi Central -0.178 0.014 -0.001 0.094 
Jiangsu Eastern 0.539* 0.658* 0.563* -0.325 
Jilin Central 2.750 -0.006 0.006 0.039 
Qinghai Western 2.540*** 1.782*** 1.982*** 0.960* 
Fujian Eastern 0.000 0.051 -0.017 -0.365 
Heilongjiang Central -0.063 -0.047 0.005 -0.392 
Henan Central -0.027 0.007 0.008 -0.178 
Hebei Eastern 0.223 0.607** 0.472** 0.572** 
Hunan Central 0.088 0.112 0.279 -0.002 
Hubei Central 0.005 -0.122 -0.151 -0.092 
Xinjiang Western 2.640*** 1.385*** 1.150** 0.413 
Gansu Western 1.400*** 1.641*** 1.499*** 1.255*** 
Guangxi Eastern 0.101 0.481 0.701** -0.114 
Guizhou Western 0.066 0.706* 0.976** 0.068 
Liaoning Eastern 0.011 0.037 0.135 0.089 
Inner Mongolia Central 0.011 0.192 0.000 -0.049 
Ningxia Western 0.657* 0.767* 0.983** 1.026** 
Beijing Eastern 1.410*** 3.553*** 2.332*** 2.731*** 
Shanghai Eastern 0.900** 1.508** 1.417** 0.393 
Shanxi Central 0.006 0.077 0.025 0.246 
Shandong Eastern 0.132 0.174 0.296 0.109 
Shaanxi Western 0.531* 0.761** 0.484* 0.332 
Sichuan Western 0.747 -0.150 -0.350 0.019 
Tianjin Eastern 1.302*** 3.135*** 1.996*** 2.100*** 
Yunnan Western -0.657 0.554 0.350 0.240 
Guangdong Eastern 0.052 0.022 0.151 -0.110 
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Chongqing Western 0.383 -0.181 -0.291 -0.271 
Note: ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are z-statistics.  
 
 In Figures 4 and 5, we use Moran scatterplots of 1998 and 2014 to illustrate the concepts 
above.   In Figure 4, 20 of the 29 administrative units in China are similarly clustered in 1998 in 
terms of positive dependence, which means a high-high value of the Gini coefficient (11 
provinces or municipalities shown in quadrant 1) and of low-low value of the Gini coefficient (9 
provinces or municipalities shown in quadrant 3). In 2014, 19 of the 29 administrative units in 
China reveal a positive association ─ 10 provinces or municipalities with a high-high value of 
the Gini coefficient and 9 provinces or municipalities with a low-low value of the Gini 
coefficient (Figure 5). In brief, the Moran scatterplots indicate two types of spatial 
autocorrelation, a spatial clustering of high-high values of the Gini coefficient and a spatial 
clustering of low-low values of the Gini coefficient, indicating positive spatial autocorrelation. 
Another finding from the Moran scatterplot in 1998 is, as expected, a regional polarization 
between coast and inland provinces, indicating Western inland-provinces in the spatial clustering 
of high-high values of the Gini coefficient and Eastern coast-provinces in the spatial clustering of 
low-low values of the Gini coefficient. In 2014, however, the Moran scatterplot does not show 
regional polarization between coast and inland provinces. Also, the slope of the Moran 
scatterplot in 2014 is smaller (or flatter) than in 1998, indicating the degree of spatial dependence 
decreases from 1998 to 2014. This is consistent with the decline in the Gini reported in Table 3.2. 
Figure 3.4: Moran scatterplots for Gini coefficient in 1998 
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Figure 3.5: Moran scatterplots for Gini coefficient in 2014 
 
 
3.4.3 Cross-Sectional Spatial Model 
 In this section, we examine the cross-sectional spatial model for 1998, 2003, 2008 and 
2013.  First, a simple OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) regression was estimated and its residuals 
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are used to determine whether any specific spatial model is needed. If the Moran test of OLS 
residuals shows spatial dependence, we must proceed to examine spatial models. Table 3.4 
presents the OLS estimation results with provincial data without controlling for spatial 
dependence. All financial indicators are positive but not significant in 1998 is significant, while 
GDP per capita is significant at the 5% significance level and has a negative impact on the Gini 
coefficient. The direction of the effect of GDP per capita on the Gini coefficient is intuitive at 
first glance. For the data sample in 2003, total deposit to provincial GDP and total loan to 
provincial GDP are statistically significant and their signs are positive. In addition, the direction 
of the effect of educational attainment on the Gini coefficient is initially intuitive since in general 
it is expected that the effect of educational attainment on the Gini coefficient is negative. To 
check the necessity of using a spatial model for China’s income inequality analysis, we conduct 
the Moran’s test on the OLS residuals.  The results are presented in Table 3.4.  The p-values of 
the Moran’s I statistic indicate the rejection of the null hypothesis for all three financial measures 
in 1998.  Furthermore, the null hypothesis is rejected for financial intermediation to provincial 
GDP and total deposit to provincial GDP in 2003 and for all three financial measures in 2008, 
while the Moran test fails to reject for all three financial measures in 2013. Thus, there are 
indications that spatial dependences matter in the sample data from 1998, 2003, and 2008 and 
that spatial models should be estimated. 
 As mentioned, there are various ways that spatial dependence may enter the model.  To 
determine the type of dependence, we use the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test to find the most 
suitable spatial model. There are five different types of LM tests: (1) LMerr: the LM test for 
error dependence; (2) LMlag: the LM test for missing spatially lagged dependent variable; (3) 
RLMerr: the robust LM error that investigates for spatial error dependence in the possible of 
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presence of a missing lagged dependent variable; (4) RLMlag: the robust LM lag that 
investigates for spatially lagged dependent variable; and (5) SARMA, which tests for both lag 
and a moving average error. The robust LM tests enable us to understand what type of spatial 
dependence captures the data best. Table 3.4 shows that LMlag and RLMlag are significant at the 
5% significance level, while SARMA is significant at the 10% significance level for the dataset 
from 1998, indicating the presence of spatial dependence, telling us that SARAR or the spatial 
lag model should be applied to handle spatial dependence for the sample data from 1998. 
Similarly, the spatial lag model is selected for the financial intermediation to provincial GDP for 
2003 based on the LM test. However, although the global Moran test on the 2008 data rejects the 
null hypothesis that there is no spatial dependence in the model, the LM test does not specify a 
suitable spatial model.  
Table 3.4: The OLS estimations, Moran’s I, and LM test 
(Dependent Variable: Gini coefficient) 
  1998   2003  
f_gdp 5.81 
(0.19) 
  36.03 
(1.01) 
  
d_gdp  3.52 
(1.03) 
  3.22* 
(1.93) 
 
l_gdp   2.14 
(0.72) 


















































Moran’s I 0.22** 0.14** 0.14** 0.28***	 0.17**	 0.08	
LMerr 2.36 0.98 0.98 3.71* 1.43  
LMlag 4.20** 2.79* 3.20* 7.12*** 4.37**  
RLMerr 0.58 1.61 1.78 0.17 0.82  
RLMlag 2.42** 3.42* 3.99** 3.58* 3.77*  
SARMA 4.78* 4.40 4.98* 7.29** 5.20*  
  2008   2013  
f_gdp 8.68 
(0.26) 
  26.35 
(0.44) 
  
d_gdp  0.50   -0.63  
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(0.34) (-0.27) 
l_gdp   1.07 
(0.48) 


















































Moran’s I 0.13*	 0.11*	 0.13*	 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 
LMerr 0.76 0.56 0.82    
LMlag 1.98 1.83 1.95    
RLMerr 0.46 0.67 0.30    
RLMlag 1.69 1.94 1.43    
SARMA 2.45 2.50 2.25    
Note: ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics. 
  
 The estimation results of the spatial regression model on the effect of financial 
development on income inequality are reported for 1998 and 2003 in Table 3.5. First, in the 
sample data from 1998, the spatial lag and error model shows that the association between the 
ratio of financial intermediation to provincial GDP and income inequality is positive but 
insignificant. The spatial lag dependence, 𝜌, is positively significant at the 1% significance level, 
while the spatial error dependence, 𝜆, is negatively significant. In addition, the Moran test results 
after estimating the spatial model shows that there is no more spatial dependence in the residuals 
of the spatial model with the sample data from 1998. The second finding is that the spatial lag 
dependence is positively significant at the 1% significance level, while spatial error dependence 
is negatively significant. However, the relationship between financial development and income 
inequality in 2003 is insignificant.  
 As for the control variables, an initial finding is the effect of GDP per capita on income 
inequality. In the sample data from 1998, the effect of GDP per capita is insignificant for all 
estimation models. Additionally, the effect of GDP per capita is significantly negative at the 1% 
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and 5% significance levels, respectively, for the sample data from 2003. Another control variable, 
educational attainment is significant at the 10% and 5% significance levels and its sign is 
negative in 2003. The direction of the effect of educational attainment on the Gini coefficient is 
quite reasonable because an increase in educational attainment leads a reduction in income 
inequality.  
 
Table 3.5: Spatial Model Estimations: SARAR (1,1) models 
(Dependent Variable: Gini Coefficient) 
 1998 2003 
F_gdp -3.25 
(-0.14) 
  -4.06 
(-0.21) 
 
D_gdp  1.91 
(0.86) 
  1.25 
(1.16) 































































Note: ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are z-statistics.  
 
Table 3.6: Direct & Indirect effects (1998) 
 f_gdp d_gdp l_gdp 
 Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total 
F_gdp -4.04 -6.98 -11.02       
D_gdp    2.39 4.24 6.63    
L_gdp       2.28 3.97 6.24 
Lgdp_ca -3.87 -6.67 -10.54 -3.57 -6.32 -9.89 -3.62 -6.29 -9.91 
Open 3.29 5.67 8.96 2.04 3.62 5.66 3.29 5.74 9.03 
Edu -15.54 -26.82 -42.36 -29.22 -51.73 -80.95 -20.77 -36.15 -56.92 
 
Table 3.7: Direct & Indirect effects: (2003) 
 f_gdp d_gdp 
	 119	
 Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total 
F_gdp -5.54 -13.52 -19.06    
D_gdp    1.64 3.39 5.03 
Lgdp_ca -4.24 -10.35 -14.59 -3.61 -7.47 -11.08 
Open 1.92 4.68 6.60 0.74 1.53 2.27 
Edu -14.59 -35.61 -50.19 -22.99 -47.62 -70. 
 
 We cannot directly interpret the estimation coefficients for independent variables in 
spatial analysis since the spatial models include the lags of the dependent variable and of the 
independent variables in space and time. Thus, we calculate the indirect and direct effects as 
presented in Tables 3.6 and 3.7. Indirect effects of each explanatory variable shown in Tables 3.6 
and 3.7 indicate whether provincial Gini is associated with the explanatory variables in its 
neighboring provinces, while direct effects show how explanatory variables impact Gini in its 
own province. For the cross-sectional spatial model, two financial measurements ─ the ratio of 
financial intermediation to provincial GDP and the ratio of deposit to provincial GDP ─ have 
positively significant impact on income inequality in the sample data from 2003. First, the direct 
effect of the ratio of financial intermediation to provincial GDP in 2003 is negative but 
insignificant, suggesting that a 1 point increase in the ratio of financial intermediation to 
provincial GDP leads to a 5.54 point decrease in provincial Gini. The indirect effect, spatial 
spillover effect, is positively significant, suggesting that a 1 unit increase in the financial 
intermediation to provincial GDP ratio leads to a 13.52 decrease in neighboring provincial Gini. 
In other words, as for f_gdp, the average total effect of -19.06 comes in the form of -5.54 as the 
result of the province raising its own f_gdp and -13.52 as the result of all other provinces raising 
their f_gdp. Next, the direct effect of the ratio of deposit to provincial GDP is positive but 
insignificant, signifying that the average total effect of 5.03 comes in the form of 1.64 as the 
result of province raising its own d_gdp and 3.39 as the result of all other neighboring provinces 
raising their d_gdp. 
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3.4.4 Pooled OLS & Pooled SARAR Models 
 The number of data points of the cross-sectional spatial model is limited. A panel data 
model expands the size of the sample and therefore should be considered to investigate the 
relationship between financial development and income inequality based on the dataset over the 
period between 1998 and 2014. We start our analysis of panel data with from pooled OLS 
without random, fixed, and spatial effects and a pooled SARAR model without random or fixed 
effects. Tables 3.8 and 3.9 present the results from the pooled OLS and Pooled SARAR models. 
First, the estimations from pooled OLS show that D_GDP and L_GDP are positively significant 
at the 1% significance level, suggesting that a higher ratio of deposit to provincial GDP (or ratio 
of loan to provincial GDP) increases income inequality. Next, the pooled SARAR (1,1) model 
(with spatial effects) estimators in Table 3.8 shows that all financial indicators are positively 
significant at the 1% significance level, indicating that raising the degree of financial 
development is associated with an increase in income inequality. The SARAR (0,1) and SARAR 
(1,0) results in Table 3.9 confirm that the spatial lag effect is more important than the spatial 
error effect and that the two effects appear to work in opposite directions. 
 However, while these results are promising, the simple pooling of the data may not be 
appropriate. In particular, we should consider the possibility of provincial level heterogeneity. 
Each province or municipality may have its own individual characteristics that may or may not 
influence the predictor or outcome variables as provincial policy may influence its Gini 
coefficient. For this reason, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity that is constant over time 
and may or may not be correlated with independent variables (a fixed or random effect model) 
enables us to measure the net effects of explanatory variables on Gini coefficients more 
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accurately. Thus, the following section introduces a spatial panel model, which incorporates 
spatial effects and fixed or random effects.  
Table 3.8: Pooled OLS & Pooled SARAR (1,1) Model Estimations between 1998 and 2014 
(Dependent Variable: Gini × 100) 
 Pooled OLS  Pooled SARAR (1,1) 
F_gdp 4.04 
(0.41) 
  18.94*** 
(3.29) 
  
D_gdp  2.75*** 
(6.00) 
  0.77*** 
(2.74) 
 
L_gdp   3.29*** 
(5.75) 






























































Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics. Rho is the slope of Wy, and Lambda is the slope of Wu. 
 
Table 3.9: Pooled SARAR Model (0,1) & (1,0) Estimations between 1998 and 2014 
(Dependent Variable: Gini × 100) 
 Pooled SARAR (1,0) Pooled SARAR (0,1) 
F_gdp 9.35 
(1.03) 
  19.95*** 
(2.96) 
  
D_gdp  2.61*** 
6.11) 
  1.12*** 
(3.44) 
 
L_gdp   3.20*** 
(6.03) 
























































   






Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics. Rho is the slope of Wy, and Lambda is the slope of Wu. 
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3.4.5 Spatial Panel Model19  
 Followed by Pooled SARAR Models, spatial panel model is employed to capture spatial 
interactions across provinces between 1998 and 2014. Spatial panel model includes a spatial lag 
of the dependent variable and spatial autoregressive disturbances: 
y = ρWy + Xβ + u      (14) 
where y is a n by 1 vector of observations on the dependent variable, X is a n by k matrix of k 
explanatory variable, and W is a n by n spatial weight matrix. u (disturbance vector) can be 
expressed as:   
u = µ + e             (15) 
where µ  is a vector of time-invariant individual specific effects but not spatially autocorrelated 
and it can be treated as fixed or random effect. e is a vector of spatially autocorrelated 
innovations followed by: 
e = λWe+ v             (16) 
where λ  is the spatial autoregressive coefficient and W is the spatial weight matrix.  
 The estimation results from the spatial panel model are reported in Tables 3.10, 3.11, and 
3.12. First, we conducted spatial random effect estimation for the SARAR (1, 0), SARAR (0,1), 
and SARAR (1,1) models. The empirical finding from SARAR (1,1) in Table 3.12 shows strong 
evidence of a significant spatial autocorrelation of the errors and the importance of spatial 
dependence. The spatial lag and error are both significant at the 1% significance level for 
																																																								
19  To explore further, we add a lagged Gini, i.e., Ginit-1, as one of the explanatory variables on the right hand side in 
all our models (i.e., SARAR (1,0), SARAR (0,1), SARAR (1,1) and both fixed / random effects). All the results 
indicate that financial variables are not significant in all cases. Since the dynamic factor in the spatial model is still 
an ongoing research topic, we will keep this in our future research agenda.   
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SARAR (1,0), (0,1), and (1,1), suggesting the value of the Gini coefficient of each administrative 
unit is affected by its neighboring administrative units. Generally, in spatial analysis, we cannot 
directly interpret the coefficient of explanatory variables in Tables 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12. For this 
reason, Table 3.13 provides direct, indirect, and total effect. The spatial lag model SARAR (1,0) 
shows that a change in x, say Dx, in one province causes an effect on y locally and spatially. Now, 
a change in the disturbance u in one province (Du) will similarly cause an effect on y locally and 
spatially. The spatial error model SARAR (0,1) implies that Dx (a change in the disturbance x 
variable in one province) in one province will only cause an effect on y locally, but 𝑢 = 𝜌 ∗𝑊 ∗
𝑢 + 𝑒, then De will still cause an effect on y locally and spatially. Therefore, one way in which 
we can compare the nature of the spatial interaction in the two models is by comparing the direct 
and indirect effects that are dictated by (𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊) !! and (𝐼 − 𝜆𝑊) !!respectively. Since 𝜌 is 
larger than 𝜆 and the W matrices are the same, the direct and indirect effects should be larger for 
the latter than the former. Thus, spatial lag model SARAR (1,0) shows more important spatial 
effects. Indirect effects are used to see whether provincial Gini coefficients can be related to its 
neighboring provinces, while direct effects indicate how explanatory variables impact dependent 
variable in its own province. The estimations in Table 3.12 should be complemented with those 
in Table 3.13 to make correct inferences since the provincial Gini coefficients in the left hand 
side of the estimation equation is jointly affected by the neighboring provinces’ Gini coefficients. 
In other words, financial development in a specific province may impact the Gini in that 
province and in other provinces; vice versa, the Gini in a specific province is determined by the 
level of financial development in that province and the financial development in other provinces. 
The direct effect is calculated as the average of the diagonal elements of the (𝐼 − 𝜆𝑊!) !! matrix, 
while the indirect effect is calculated as the average of either the row sums or the column sums 
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of the non-diagonal elements of this matrix (LeSage and Pace, 2009; Debarsy et al., 2012). The 
direct effect of the ratio of financial intermediation to provincial GDP in the first column of 
Table 3.13 is negatively significant at the 1% significance level, as expected. A higher ratio of 
financial intermediation to provincial GDP decreases income inequality, suggesting that a 1 point 
increase in the ratio of financial intermediation to provincial GDP leads to a 25.83 point decrease 
in provincial Gini coefficients. The indirect effect, which is the spatial spillover effect, is 
negative and significant at the 5% significance level. An increase in the financial intermediation 
ratio will decrease income inequality in neighboring provinces, indicating that a 1 unit increase 
in the ratio of financial intermediation to provincial GDP leads to a 23.95 decrease in 
neighboring provincial Gini coefficients. Interestingly, the financial intermediation ratio has a 
negative impact on income inequalities in one’s own province and on its neighboring provinces.  
 As for the control variable, the variable of openness towards a world economy is 
significant at the 1% significant level and its sign is positive, suggesting opening-up policy, a 
driving force of economic development in China, increases regional inequality. The direct effect 
estimate of openness in the first column of Table 3.13 is significantly positive at the 1% 
significance level. A higher degree of openness will increase Gini coefficients: A 1 point 
increase in the degree of openness leads to a 2.44 point increase in the Gini. The indirect impact 
estimate of the degree of openness is still positively significant.  
 In addition, the direct effect estimate of educational attainment is negative but 
insignificant: It appears from this model that educational attainment is not a determinant of 
income inequality. However, the effect of educational attainment on the Gini coefficient is not 
quite intuitive because it is expected that an increase in educational attainment leads to a 
reduction in income inequality.  
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 In Table 3.12, the spatial panel fixed effect20 estimation shows that only spatial lag in the 
model is statistically significant at the 1% significance level, indicating that the level of the Gini 
coefficient of each province seems to be affected by neighboring provinces. The fourth column 
for the fixed effect model reveals that the ratio of financial intermediation to provincial GDP is 
an important determinant of income inequality and significant at the 1% significance level in 
explaining income inequality in China. The direct effect of the ratio of financial intermediation 
to provincial GDP in the fourth column of Table 3.13 is negatively significant. A higher ratio of 
financial intermediation to provincial GDP decreases income inequality, suggesting that a 1 point 
increase in the ratio of financial intermediation to provincial GDP leads to a 26.21 point decrease 
in provincial Gini coefficients. The spatial spillover effect (or indirect effect) is negative and 
insignificant, indicating that 1point increase in the ratio of financial intermediation to provincial 
GDP leads to a 25.36 point decrease in neighboring provincial Gini coefficients. As for the 
control variable, the direct effect estimate of the openness in the first column of Table 3.13 is 
positively significant at 1% significance level. Higher degree of openness will increase Gini 
coefficients. A 1 point increase in the degree of openness leads to a 2.68 point increase in Gini 
coefficients. The indirect impact estimate of the degree of openness is still positively significant, 
indicating that raising the degree of openness to a world economy by 1 point is associated with 
an increase in income inequality by 2.59 point. However, the direct effect estimate of educational 
attainment in the fourth column of Table 3.13 is positive but not significant, which is the same as 
the spatial random effect model. The coefficient of spatial autocorrelation of the errors and the 
spatial lag dependence from SARAR (1,1) are very close to the fixed effect estimation. Lastly, 
																																																								
20 The Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) is utilized to compare random effects estimators with fixed effects estimators 
and to test whether the random or fixed effects assumption is supported by given dataset. Later, this test is extended 
to spatial framework by Mutl and Pfaffermayr (2011). For our initial model (Table 8), the results on the Hausman 
test indicate that random effect SARAR (1,1) is preferred. For all three alternative specifications, however, the fixed 
effect SARAR (1,1) is supported by the given dataset.    
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another finding from Table 3.13 indicates that the direct effects of regional characteristics for 
fixed effect SARAR (1,1) are perhaps more important than the indirect effects or spatial 
spillovers. For example, while the direct effects of regional characteristics are negatively 
significant at the 1% significance level, the indirect effects or spatial spillovers are significant at 
the 10% significance level, producing an overall significant impact on provincial income 
inequality. This result suggests a possible divergence between the interests of provincial (or 
local) and national officials since generally the latter would take a broader perspective on 
economic policy. 
 We want to highlight that the sign of the financial indicator from the spatial panel model 
is negative, which differs from the sign of those from pooled OLS and pooled SARAR, which do 
not consider fixed or random effects. As shown in Table 3.A.1 the panel fixed effect model 
indicates that the ratio of financial intermediation to provincial GDP is negatively significant at 
the 1% significance level, which is consistent with the sign of its ratio from the spatial panel 
model in this section. Thus, it is indeed the introduction of fixed or random effects into the 
model, as a way to control for provincial level heterogeneity, that causes the switch in the sign of 
the effect of financial intermediation and other variables in the model. I.e., without allowing for 
provincial level heterogeneity, the slope of the financial intermediation variable must account for 
the variable’s own direct effect (which is shown here be negative) and its indirect effect through 
its apparently positive correlation with the time-invariant provincial heterogeneous factor. The 
net effect is apparently positive as shown in Tables 3.8 and 3.9. 
Table 3.10: Spatial Panel Data Model Estimations between 1998 and 2014 
(Dependent Variable: Gini × 100) 
 Spatial Lag Model  
 Random Effect, SARAR (1,0) Fixed Effect, SARAR (1,0) 
F_gdp -23.60*** 
(-3.26) 
  -24.61*** 
(-3.43) 
  
D_gdp  0.22   0.07  
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(0.46) (0.14) 
L_gdp   0.09 
(0.18) 

























































Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics. Rho is the slope of Wy, and Lambda is the slope of Wu. 
 
Table 3.11: Spatial Panel Data Model Estimations between 1998 and 2014 
(Dependent Variable: Gini × 100) 
 Spatial Error Model  
 Random Effect, SARAR (0,1) Fixed Effect, SARAR (0,1) 
F_gdp -19.94** 
(-2.42) 
  -21.80*** 
(-2.70) 
  
D_gdp  0.25 
(0.49) 
  0.05 
(0.09) 
 
L_gdp   -0.01 
(-0.02) 

























































Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics. Rho is the slope of Wy, and Lambda is the slope of Wu. 
 
Table 3.12: Spatial Panel Data Model Estimations between 1998 and 2014 
(Dependent Variable: Gini × 100) 
 Spatial Lag and Error Model  
 Random Effect, SARAR (1,1) Fixed Effect SARAR (1,1) 
F_gdp -23.30*** 
(-3.48) 
  -23.50*** 
(-3.27) 
  
D_gdp  0.19 
(0.42) 
  0.04 
(0.10) 
 
L_gdp   0.10 
(0.22) 














Open 2.20*** 0.19 0.40 2.40*** 0.63 0.81 
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Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics. Rho is the slope of Wy, and Lambda is the slope of Wu. 
 
Table 3.13: Direct & Indirect effects  
(Dependent Variable: Gini × 100) 
 Random effect SARAR (1,1) Fixed effect SARAR (1,1) 
 Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total 
F_gdp -25.83*** -23.95** -49.78*** -26.21*** -25.36 -51.57** 
Lgdp_ca 1.63*** 1.51*** 3.14*** 1.44*** 1.39 2.83** 
Open 2.44*** 2.26** 4.70*** 2.68*** 2.59 5.27*** 
Edu -0.41 -0.38 -0.79 1.95 1.88 3.83 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics.  
 
 To check the robustness of the estimation results, we conduct alternative specifications. 
The first alternative specification integrates two municipalities of Beijing and Tianjin into the 
province of Hebei. In other words, Beijing and Tianjin share their borders but they are part of the 
province Hebei without sharing their borders with any other province. To incorporate Beijing 
and Tianjin into province Hebei, the average values of each variable are calculated and replaced 
with the initial values of variables in the dataset. The estimation results for the first alternative 
specification are reported in Tables 11a, 11b, and 11c of Appendix. The direct effect of the ratio 
of financial intermediation to provincial GDP in the first column of Table 12 is negatively 
significant at the 1% significance level. In the estimation of the fixed effect SARAR (1,1), a 
higher ratio of financial intermediation to provincial GDP decreases income inequality, 
suggesting that a 1 point increase in the ratio of financial intermediation to provincial GDP leads 
to a 20.57 point decrease in provincial Gini coefficients. The indirect effect, which is the spatial 
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spillover effect, is negative and significant at the 5% significance level. An increase in the 
financial intermediation ratio will decrease income inequality, suggesting that a 1 point increase 
in the financial intermediation ratio leads to a 30.94 point decrease in provincial Gini coefficients 
in neighboring provinces. These results from fixed effect SARAR (1,1) are similar to results 
when Beijing and Tianjin are treated as separate provincial units. Therefore, estimating the 
model with Beijing and Tianjin treated separately or with them integrated into Hebei province 
does not seem to create decisive differences.  
 As for the second alternative specification, we incorporate Shanghai, one of 
municipalities in Eastern China, into Zhejiang province and also incorporate Beijing and Tianjin 
into Hebei province. Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai are municipalities, which have grown 
rapidly and have the most diversified and developed banking sector. The banking sector in these 
municipalities is characterized by fewer policy loans from the central bank and a highly 
diversified banking sector.  In addition, the sizes of these three cities are much smaller than other 
provinces: the size of Beijing is 16,411 km2, the size of Tianjin is 11,760 km2, and the size of 
Shanghai is 6, 341 km2. Separating three large municipalities gives them special status whereas 
other large cities (perhaps Chengdu and Shenzhen) are treated as being part of the province in 
which they are located. Merging three municipalities into the province where they are located 
allows us to treat all the provinces and their large cities in the same way to have more 
homogeneity. In the same way, to incorporate Shanghai into province Zhejiang, the average 
values of each variable are calculated and replaced with the initial values of variables in province 
Zhejiang. The estimation results after incorporating the three municipalities into each province 
are reported in Tables 13a, 13b, and 13c of the Appendix, and the results in the fixed effect 
SARAR (1,1) remains similar to the equation with those three cities, supporting the empirical 
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findings that the significant association between financial development and income inequality 
does not result from these specific municipalities. As shown in the Table 13c, the ratio of deposit 
to GDP and the ratio of loan to GDP in the random effect SARAR (1,1) and the ratio of loan to 
GDP in the fixed effect SARAR (1,1) are now positively significant. In Table 9 and 11, these 
slopes were positive as well but statistically insignificant.  
 Next, we verify the consistency of our spatial analysis results for the estimation of 
missing Gini coefficients. Basically, for the spatial analysis in this paper, missing Gini 
coefficients are predicted based on GMM estimation from its neighboring provinces. However, 
each province may be classified as in either the Eastern, or Western, or Central region. Thus, we 
check whether the spatial analysis results are different if the missing Gini coefficients are 
predicted based on the whole administrative regions rather than just the neighboring provinces. 
The spatial analysis results based on the predicted Gini coefficients from its administrative 
regions are reported in Tables 15a, 15b, and 15c of the Appendix. First, the result in the random 
effect SARAR (1,1) (the coefficient of financial intermediation to GDP: -17.33) is not much 
different from the original results that predicted missing Gini coefficients based on its 
neighboring provinces (the coefficient of financial intermediation to GDP: -23.30). Both indicate 
that a higher ratio of financial intermediation to provincial GDP leads to a decrease in Gini 
coefficients. In the same way, the coefficient of financial intermediation to provincial GDP (-
17.27) in the fixed effect SARAR (1,1) based on its administrative regions is similar with those 
based on the neighboring provinces (-23.50), indicating that an increase in the ratio of financial 
intermediation to provincial GDP leads to a reduction in income inequality.  
 Lastly, a regional dummy for Eastern province is added to the right-hand side of equation 
since Eastern provinces received much more attention and effort from foreign investors and 
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central government than Central and Western provinces. The empirical results with a regional 
dummy (1=Eastern, 0 otherwise) are reported in Table 17. After adding a regional dummy, the 
ratio of financial intermediation to provincial GDP remains negative and statistically significant 
at the 1% significance level. As for the regional dummy, all columns in Table 17a and 17b 
present that region dummies are statistically significant at the 1% significance level, indicating 
average Gini coefficients in Eastern provinces are less than Central and Western provinces. 
Table 18 reports the direct and indirect effect of the ratio of financial intermediation to provincial 
GDP. First, the direct effect suggests that a 1 point increase in the ratio of financial 
intermediation to provincial GDP leads to a 28.57 decrease in provincial Gini coefficients. The 
spatial spillover effect, which is the indirect effect, indicates that 1 point increase in the financial 
intermediation ratio decreases provincial Gini coefficients in neighboring provinces by 23.77.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 Since 1978, economic reforms have succeeded in moving China from an egalitarianism-
planned economy to a socialist market-oriented economy, achieving a high level of economic 
growth. Following stellar growth rates in the past three decades, however, income inequality in 
China is one of the world’s worst, with the richest 1% of households acquiring one-third of the 
country’s wealth21. At the same time, the poorest 25% of households have 1% of the country’s 
total wealth. This high level of inequality poses a hidden risk of social unrest. With the 
government’s strong desire to lower its income inequality, many contributing factors have been 
identified to this rising inequality. Due to the manifold aspects of a large growing economy such 
as China, ongoing research on income inequality is essential. One of these areas is the 
																																																								
21 Peking University (2012) 
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relationship between financial development and income inequality, which Kuznets (1955) noted 
as an urbanization process. On its way to rapid economic growth, China designated special 
economic zones (SEZs), most of which are located in coastal regions,22 according to a step-by-
step opening-up policy. The main policy of China’s economic reforms was that they opened and 
fostered specific cities and then these policies brought a huge spillover to the surrounding areas. 
Since the policy of special economic zones created an industrial belt in the coastal regions, the 
need for financing surged in and around these zones. Accordingly, financial development is 
different depending on the location. As a result, there is a huge gap between coastal and inland 
provinces since the mid 1980s (Zhang and Kanbur, 2001) 
 This paper examines the impact of financial development on income inequality through 
spatial econometrics techniques using panel data of 1998 to 2014. To overcome problems of 
missing income inequality values, dynamic panel data models are estimated only with provinces 
sharing their borders using the GMM technique, from which missing provincial Gini coefficients 
are predicted. This process enables estimating the spatial models to investigate the spatial 
dependence of financial development and income inequality. As an initial exploratory spatial 
data analysis, the Global Moran’s I test indicates a global significant trend to spatial 
autocorrelation on Gini coefficients for the 29 Chinese provinces or municipalities in 1998, 2003, 
2008, and 2013. This means that provinces with relatively large Gini coefficients are clustered 
with other provinces with relatively large Gini coefficients. Second, the Moran scatterplots show 
that most of provinces or municipalities exhibit positive spatial association with their neighbors 
																																																								
22 Since 1980, China has established special economic zones in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou in Guangdong province 
and Xiamen in Fujian province, and Hainan province as a special economic zone. In 1984, China opened 14 coastal 
cities to overseas investment: Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, 
Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, and Beihai. In 1990, the China decided to develop and open 
Pudong in Shanghai as well as a number of cities along Changjiang. 
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in terms of the Gini coefficients. Third, the local Moran test for 1998 indicates that the most 
urbanized Eastern provinces or municipalities and most Western provinces have a significant 
positive value of local Moran’s I, while for 2014 only some Eastern provinces or municipalities 
and Western provinces point to a tendency towards clustering of high values of Gini coefficients. 
In other words, the tendency towards clustering has diminished somewhat.  
 In general, a higher value of financial development decreases income inequality and the 
impact is stronger in the earlier years. Economic openness toward a world economy actually 
increases inequality while a higher level of educational attainment decreases provincial income 
inequality in 2003. The spatial correlation is significant in all cases. Lastly, the spatial panel 
models reveal that financial development is significant in explaining income inequality in China, 
indicating highly significant coefficients of spatial autocorrelation of the errors and spatial lag 
dependence in the spatial panel models. The coefficient on financial intermediation to provincial 
GDP is negatively significant for both random effect SARAR (1,1) and fixed effect SARAR (1,1) 
models. Moreover, for both models, the spatial error parameter is positively significant at 1% 
significance level, while the spatial lag dependence is negative but insignificant. As for 
educational attainment, its effect is not quite intuitive since it is expected that an increase in 
educational attainment reduces income inequality. To resolve this contradiction, we might 
speculate that human capital accumulation in the form of educational attainment is dominated by 
the rich. Alternatively, educational attainment is not a comparative advantage to decrease income 
inequality any more. Bradsher (2013)23 reported that attaining a college or higher degree is 
losing its power for the poor generation to escape from poverty because of increasing education 
fees, less developed financial aid, and economic growth slowing down since 2007. The result is 
																																																								
23 Bradsher, K. (2013). In China, Families Bet It All on College for Their Children, The New York Times, Feb. 16, 
2013. 
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that higher education no longer guarantees a well-paying job. In addition, urban students are 
much more favored for the college entrance exam than rural students, and major universities are 
primarily located in Beijing and Shanghai, preferring urban to rural students. Thus, educational 
attainment does not contribute to a decrease in the Gini coefficient.  
 This paper has the following policy implications. First, income inequality has grown 
since 2002 and remains at a high level despite the efforts of the Chinese government to reduce it. 
A possible reason for the rise of income disparities is rapid economic growth derived from 
massive economic reforms. The series of economic reforms mainly enabled productivity 
improvement of state-owned industrial enterprises, which explains the root of the rapid economic 
growth. For quick economic growth, however, Chinese reforms focused on coastal areas and 
their spillover effects from these areas. As verified by the spatial analysis, it is more important to 
handle regional imbalance for the ultimate reasons of income disparities in China. Figure 1 
illustrates that recently the overall Chinese Gini coefficient has dropped slightly. However, the 
mean of Gini coefficients for 29 administrative units has sharply increased from 0.380 in 2001 to 
0.435 in 2014 after joining World Trade Organization (WTO), and the standard deviation of the 
Gini coefficients for 29 administrative units has surged from 0.054 to 0.071 during the same 
period of time. Therefore, more attention needs to be paid to a regionally balanced policy for the 
inter-provinces. Second, a microscopic approach is needed to alleviate income disparities along 
with rapid economic development. The central Chinese government has tried to reduce income 
disparities and has attained some success, such as a decreasing Gini coefficient from 0.491 to 
0.469 (Figure 1). However, an important reason for the high levels of national Gini coefficients 
in China is from income disparities within provinces. In other words, there are still huge gaps 
between urban and rural areas with any given province. The spatial regression model examines 
	 135	
how local policy variables change local outcome, after allowing for geographic (or spatial) 
spillovers. Central government policy will change those local policy variables in many provinces 
at the same time, but it cannot induce greater spillover effects, which are part of the economic 
structure. Thus, a rigorous policy conducted by local (or provincial) government and customized 




Table 3.A.1: Panel Data Model Estimations between 1998 and 2014:  
(Dependent Variable: Gini × 100) 
 Panel Model (Without Spatial effect) 
 Random Effect Fixed Effect 
F_gdp -31.84*** 
(-3.69) 
  -39.79*** 
(-4.84) 
  
D_gdp  0.97* 
(1.87) 
  0.15 
(0.26) 
 
L_gdp   0.96* 
(1.75) 












































   
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics.  
 
Table 3.A.2: Spatial Panel Data Model Estimations between 1998 and 2014:  
After dropping Beijing and Tianjin (Dependent Variable: Gini × 100) 
 Spatial Panel Model  
 Random Effect, SARAR (1,0) Fixed Effect, SARAR (1,0) 
F_gdp -17.96** 
(-2.33) 
  -20.39*** 
(-2.66) 
  
D_gdp  0.90* 
(1.83) 
  0.65 
(1.27) 
 
L_gdp   0.73 
(1.42) 


























































Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics. Rho is the slope of Wy 
 
Table 3.A.3: Spatial Panel Data Model Estimations between 1998 and 2014:  
After dropping Beijing and Tianjin (Dependent Variable: Gini × 100) 
 Spatial Panel Model  
 Random Effect, SARAR (0,1) Fixed Effect, SARAR (0,1) 
F_gdp -10.93 
(-1.23) 
  -13.45 
(-1.52) 
  
D_gdp  0.99* 
(1.85) 
  0.66 
(1.18) 
 
L_gdp   0.89 
(1.53) 

























































Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics. Lambda is the slope of Wu. 
 
Table 3.A.4: Spatial Panel Data Model Estimations between 1998 and 2014:  
After dropping Beijing and Tianjin (Dependent Variable: Gini × 100) 
 Spatial Panel Model  
 Random Effect, SARAR (1,1) Fixed Effect SARAR (1,1) 
F_gdp -17.07*** 
(-2.65) 
  -17.98*** 
(-2.71) 
  
D_gdp  0.69 
(1.58) 
  0.46 
(1.05) 
 
L_gdp   0.63 
(1.42) 






































































Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics. Rho is the slope of Wy, and Lambda is the slope of Wu. 
 
Table 3.A.5: Direct & Indirect effects 
(Dependent Variable: Gini × 100) 
 Random effect SARAR (1,1) Fixed effect SARAR (1,1) 
 Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total 
F_gdp -20.57*** -30.94** -51.52** -21.84*** -33.99** -55.83** 
Lgdp_ca 1.43*** 2.15* 3.58** 1.33*** 2.07** 3.40*** 
Open 1.98** 2.97 4.95* 2.31*** 3.60** 5.91** 
Edu -2.00 -3.00 -5.00 -0.87 -1.36 -2.23 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Table 3.A.6: Spatial Panel Data Model Estimations between 1998 and 2014:  
After dropping Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai (Dependent Variable: Gini × 100) 
 Spatial Lag Model  
 Random Effect, SARAR (1,0) Fixed Effect, SARAR (1,0) 
F_gdp -21.48** 
(-2.55) 
  -25.30*** 
(-2.99) 
  
D_gdp  0.94* 
(1.85) 
  0.69 
(1.30) 
 
L_gdp   1.07** 
(2.01) 

























































Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics. Rho is the slope of Wy. 
 
Table 3.A.7: Spatial Panel Data Model Estimations between 1998 and 2014:  
After dropping Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai (Dependent Variable: Gini × 100) 
 Spatial Error Model  
 Random Effect, SARAR (0,1) Fixed Effect, SARAR (0,1) 
F_gdp -14.94 
(-1.52) 
  -19.14* 
(-1.95) 
  
D_gdp  0.87 
(1.58) 
  0.50 
(0.88) 
 
L_gdp   1.15* 
(1.89) 
























































Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics. Lambda is the slope of Wu. 
 
Table 3.A.8: Spatial Panel Data Model Estimations between 1998 and 2014:  
After dropping Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai (Dependent Variable: Gini × 100) 
 Spatial Lag and Error Model  
 Random Effect, SARAR (1,1) Fixed Effect SARAR (1,1) 
F_gdp -19.20*** 
(-2.77) 
  -20.74*** 
(-2.87) 
  
D_gdp  0.78* 
(1.75) 
  1.26 
(0.56) 
 
L_gdp   0.96** 
(2.13) 





































































Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics. Rho is the slope of Wy, and Lambda is the slope of Wu. 
 
Table 3.A.9: Direct & Indirect effects 
(Dependent Variable: Gini coefficient × 100) 
 Random effect SARAR (1,1) Fixed effect SARAR (1,1) 
 Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total 
F_gdp -23.04*** -33.71** -56.75** -25.09*** -38.21** -63.31** 
Lgdp_ca 1.54*** 2.25** 3.79*** 1.44*** 2.20** 3.64** 
Open 2.17*** 3.17** 5.34** 2.53** 3.86* 6.39** 
Edu -2.81 -4.11 -6.92 -1.72 -2.62 -4.34 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Table 3.A.10: Spatial Panel Data Model Estimations (1,0): Based on the estimated missing Ginis 
from its own regional dataset (Dependent Variable: Gini × 100)  
 Spatial Lag Model  




  -17.82** 
(-2.45) 
  
D_gdp  0.30 
(0.62) 
  0.19 
(0.40) 
 
L_gdp   0.28 
(0.58) 

























































Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics. Missing Gini coefficients are estimated based on its own regional dataset. Rho is the slope of Wy. 
 
Table 3.A.11: Spatial Panel Data Model Estimations (0,1): Based on the estimated missing Ginis 
from its own regional dataset (Dependent Variable: Gini × 100) 
 Spatial Error Model  
 Random Effect, SARAR (0,1) Fixed Effect, SARAR (0,1) 
F_gdp -14.95* 
(-1.81) 
  -16.11** 
(-1.99) 
  
D_gdp  0.30 
(0.57) 
  0.14 
(0.27) 
 
L_gdp   0.14 
(0.27) 

























































Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics. Missing Gini coefficients are estimated based on its own regional dataset. Lambda is the slope of Wu. 
 
Table 3.A.12: Spatial Panel Data Model Estimations (1,1): Based on the estimated missing Ginis 
from its own regional dataset (Dependent Variable: Gini × 100) 
 Spatial Lag and Error Model  
 Random Effect, SARAR (1,1) Fixed Effect SARAR (1,1) 
F_gdp -17.33** 
(-2.55) 
  -17.27** 
(-2.37) 
  
D_gdp  0.27 
(0.61) 
  0.18 
(0.40) 
 






































































Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics. Missing Gini coefficients are estimated based on its own regional dataset. Rho is the slope of Wy, and 
Lambda is the slope of Wu. 
 
Table 3.A.13: Direct & Indirect effects 
 Random effect SARAR (1,1) Fixed effect SARAR (1,1) 
 Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total 
F_gdp -18.93*** -15.71* -34.64** -18.89*** -15.78 -34.67** 
Lgdp_ca 1.17*** 0.97** 2.14*** 0.97** 0.81 1.79** 
Open 1.61** 1.34* 2.95** 1.81** 1.51 3.32** 
Edu 7.92* 6.57* 14.49* 10.71** 8.95 19.65** 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Table 3.A.14: Spatial Panel Data Model Estimations (1,0) & (0,1):  
Regional dummy (1 = Eastern, 0 Otherwise, Dependent Variable: Gini × 100) 
 SARAR (1,0) SARAR (0,1) 
 Random Effect 
F_gdp -26.41*** 
(-3.67) 
  -22.92*** 
(-2.80) 
  
D_gdp  -0.10 
(-0.22) 
  -0.18 
(-0.36) 
 
L_gdp   -0.16 
(-0.34) 






































































   






Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics. Rho is the slope of Wy, and Lambda is the slope of Wu. 
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Table 3.A.15: Spatial Panel Data Model Estimations between 1998 and 2014:  
Regional dummy (1 = Eastern, 0 Otherwise; Dependent Variable: Gini × 100) 




D_gdp  -0.10 
(-0.22) 
 














































Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics. Rho is the slope of Wy, and Lambda is the slope of Wu. 
 
Table 3.A.16: Direct & Indirect effects 
(Dependent Variable: Gini × 100) 
 Random effect SARAR (1,1) 
 Direct Indirect Total 
F_gdp -28.57*** -23.77** -52.34*** 
Lgdp_ca 1.86*** 1.55** 3.42*** 
Open 2.84*** 2.36** 2.95*** 
Edu -2.52 -2.10 -4.63 











4. Epilogue: A Reconciliation of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 
 
 In Chapter 2, empirical findings based on the system GMM estimator revealed a positive 
relationship between financial development and income inequality. In Chapter 3, however, 
empirical findings with spatial data analysis found a negative relationship between financial 
development and income inequality. In this chapter, I reconcile the difference between Chapter 2 
and Chapter 3.  
 Hauk and Wacziarg (2009) examined a standard model economic growth, which is 
similar to the model applied in this paper, from a panel-econometric perspective based on a 
Monte Carlo study. They simulated data that were consistent with actual data of 69 cross-country 
data over 8 five-year intervals from 1960 to 2000, and then included endogeneity, measurement 
error, and unobserved heterogeneity. To examine a standard economic growth model, the authors 
applied five common estimators of fixed effect, random effect, between estimator, Arellano-
Bond GMM estimators, and Blundell-Bond GMM estimators. The main findings from the Monte 
Carlo simulations suggest that the estimators from fixed effects and Arellano-Bond GMM 
estimators are overestimated for the speed of convergence and are underestimated for the impact 
of several common determinants of level of income. Additionally, the estimators based on the 
Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator remedied their deficiencies, but was not free from bias if 
some moment conditions were violated. Under certain conditions, the Arellano-Bond and 
Blundell-Bond system GMM estimators overcome econometric issues that dynamic panel data 
models face. If those conditions are not exactly fulfilled, however, other problematic issues may 
seriously deteriorate the estimators. OLS estimators provide a relatively better estimate for the 
speed of convergence, but have an overestimating issue for the effect of steady-state 
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determinants. In summary, by identifying one source of bias derived from omitted variables or 
reverse causality, the use of a certain class of estimators causes another problematic worse source 
stemmed from measurement error. Therefore, the Blundell-Bond system GMM is not a very reliable 
estimate, even though it is a standard estimation technique. 
 Based on this argument, to investigate the different results depending on different 
econometric methods I re-estimated the model in Chapter 2 based on 1) simple panel fixed 
effect, and 2) two stage least squares (2SLS) with fixed effect. The empirical result based on 
panel fixed effect without lag values of Gini shows that F_gdp is negative and significant, which 
is consistent with the sign of F_gdp in Chapter 3 (Table 4.1). According to Hauk and Wacziarg 
(2009), the Blundell-Bond system GMM fixed some of the deficiencies which the Arellano-Bond 
GMM estimator led to, but has another problematic issue, a moment condition violation, causing 
some bias. The panel fixed effect can be less efficient for controlling endogeneity for lag values 
of the Gini coefficient. Thus, I re-estimated without lag values of Gini based on panel fixed 
effect since the spatial panel model in Chapter 3 does not include the lag values of the Gini 
coefficients. As shown in Table 4.1, the sign of F_gdp is negative and statistically significant. I 
also re-estimated with the lag values of Gini based on 2SLS fixed effect. To control for 
endogeneity, lag values of educational attainment, GDP per capita, and each financial variable 
were used as instruments. Table 4.2 shows that the estimation result for F_gdp based on 2SLS 
with fixed effect is negative but statistically insignificant.  
 The strong spatial dependence was verified through exploratory spatial data analysis in 
Chapter 3, indicating that the spatial effects should be considered for the model specification of 
financial development and income inequality. Furthermore, the empirical results from the spatial 
panel model in Chapter 3 were estimated by maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), while the 
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software utilized for the spatial panel model allowed us to select either the GMM or MLE 
estimator for estimation. As suggested by Hauk and Wacziarg (2009), however, even a standard 
estimation technique is not a very reliable estimate. Further research on the choice of the best 
estimator based on the spatial analysis environment should be conducted for better model 
specification to examine the association between financial development and income inequality. 
Table 4.1: Chapter 2 Estimation with Panel Fixed Effect  
Variables Without Gini (-1) Without Gini (-1) 
Financial 
variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
      
F_gdp -33.77*** 
(-3.64) 
  4.09 
(0.55) 
  
D_gdp  0.15 
(0.24) 
  -0.16 
(-0.35) 
 
L_gdp   -0.15 
(-0.23) 




      






















































Adj. R2 0.55 0.68 0.68 0.99 0.99 0.99 
# of Obs. 408 408 408 384 384 384 
	
Table 4.2: Chapter 2 Estimation based on 2SLS with Panel Fixed Effect 
Financial 
variables 
(1) (2) (3) 




D_gdp  -0.06 
(-0.10) 
 




   












Open 3.39 0.64 0.15 
	 145	













Adj. R2 0.83 0.61 0.41 
# of Obs. 384 384 384 
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